UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Santa Barbara

An Essay on the Nature of World Views

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of
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in
Philosophy
by
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June 1972
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee for their patient and friendly counsel. My thanks also to Professor Alan Dundes, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley, for his efforts in reading and commenting upon an early draft of this essay. Access to Peirce's unpublished manuscripts was made possible through a research grant from Texas Tech University (The Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, project number 191-4323). Materials made available by means of this support have been of great value in developing sections in this essay which deal with Peirce's Critical Common-Sensism. Finally, I am very grateful to my wife, my parents, and my sister for their continued patience and encouragement.
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ABSTRACT

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This essay is an attempt to work out many of the epistemological details for a theory of the nature of world views, a theory recently advanced in germinal form by several scholars in Cultural Anthropology and Folkloristics. My discussion begins with a summary of the philosophical aspects of the work of these students of world view studies. This overview suggests that it would be plausible to consider that a world view is essentially a belief system. An elaboration and defense of this thesis is undertaken in the remainder of the essay.

I initially approach my consideration of this thesis by way of emending R. G. Collingwood's views on the nature of metaphysics. Collingwood sees metaphysics, so I argue, as being the scientific study of belief systems whether in historical terms or in an intercultural context. In dealing with Collingwood's work, I am chiefly concerned with developing an emended version of several of the concepts he employs, mainly the notion of absolute presupposition.
and allied terms such as presupposing, questioning, and justifying. On the basis of this analysis of Collingwood's work, I urge that principia (which is my emended version of Collingwoodian absolute presuppositions) are the kind of basic beliefs (in a given world view) which students of world view studies have begun to notice.

I next take up the problem of relativism in the context of world view studies. Here I examine Benjamin L. Whorf's claims that world views are conceptual systems (and not belief systems) and that a world view is properly understandable only in terms of its home language. I argue that world views cannot be merely conceptual systems, but must also be considered to be belief systems. I show that Whorf's relativity thesis leads to difficulties which remove it from contention as a viable hypothesis. I then propose that the problem of intercultural understanding can be approached by way of beliefs which are universal. These universal beliefs are found among all men because all human beings share certain modes of action (human universals) which presuppose these universal beliefs. In developing the notions of human universal and universal belief, I draw heavily upon the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, particularly that part of his position known as Critical Common-Sensism.
In summary, the essay provides a schema for the nature of world views or belief systems. Each belief system will contain three kinds of beliefs: universal beliefs, which are found in all cultures and are presupposed in human universals such as questioning or justifying; principia, which are beliefs that justify other beliefs, but which are not themselves justified by experience; reasoned beliefs which are justified in terms of other beliefs in the system. No belief is intrinsically a principium (or a reasoned belief or a universal belief). Beliefs have this kind of status because of their place within a system of belief.
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CHAPTER I

WORLD VIEW STUDIES

The goal of this essay is to provide a reasonably complete theory for the nature of world views in general. Although this will be a philosophical discussion, the starting point lies within the area of Cultural Anthropology and Folkloristics. I believe that the work of certain recent American students of these disciplines contains a sound but germinal account of the nature of world views: namely, that world views are systems of beliefs which, for the most part, remain implicit. I propose to put this account on display by examining, within a somewhat limited historical period, the work of a particular number of these scholars. Then, since speculating about the nature of world views is philosophical work anyway, I shall offer what I take to be an expanded and more detailed version of this account. I hope that this essay will be of some interest to colleagues in Folkloristics and Anthropology, although I must give fair warning by repeating that this is a philosophical piece. No doubt, if one were to consider what I have to say from a social scientist's standpoint, there will be many inadequacies. I hope that a similar remark will be inappropriate if offered as a philosophical criticism of this work.
The term 'world view' in its standard use, has come to indicate a universal category of culture, universal in the sense that it is presumed that every culture has a world view. Thus, it has often been the practice, when making an ethnology of a particular culture, to include a record of that culture's world view. Also, several students have traveled to various cultures with the specific intent of attempting to record only the world view of a certain culture. In this essay I will not be concerned with discussing world views per se using either of these approaches which are basically the methods of the field ethnologist. Neither will I be interested in taking into account every use that has been made of 'world view' in social science in general. Since I will be examining, from an epistemologist's point of view, what I take to be the theory of the nature of world views which is implicit in certain recent research, I shall be devoting my attention to the work of specific Folklorists and Anthropologists who have made it a speciality either to study the nature of world views or to examine world views in certain cultures as a specific ethnological project. I loosely characterize this group of scholars as practitioners of "world view studies." I begin by engaging in a short historical review of the two principal "schools" in world view studies, the group headed by Robert Redfield and that led by Ruth Benedict. This summary should provide a rough
characterization of the structure of the use of 'world view' among these scholars. On the basis of that, it will be possible to proceed to offer, in subsequent chapters, an expanded theory of the epistemological structure of world views interpreted as belief systems.

1. The Influence of Wilhelm Dilthey

Because of similarities between his theories and the work of Ruth Benedict, it will be convenient to use the work of Wilhelm Dilthey as a benchmark for this historical survey. Dilthey's term for the phenomenon in question was the well-known Germanism, Weltanschauung, which is usually translated as 'world view'. It will be helpful to describe, in summary fashion, what he understood by that idea.¹

According to Dilthey, world views result from the need for coherence and meaning in experience, a need found in

the mental life of all men. This need is realized through a process of reflection in which man brings unity and order to the total world in which he finds himself. Dilthey sees the dominant factor in this process as being what he calls "the enigma of life." By this he means

... the mystery that surrounds the great crises of birth and death, the round of the seasons and the crops, the endless battle of human freedom against natural forces and necessities... in fine, the whole mystery of the situation of mankind in the world. From the most primitive societies upward, men busy themselves to read this riddle. What is unknown is guessed at on the analogy of the known; what is unintelligible is explained by analogy from the intelligible. ... And systematic Weltanschauungen are deliberately worked out, where... a full interpretation of the universe is set forth.²

World views, as Dilthey sees it, are always based upon what he calls a "cosmic picture."³ This is a basic body of beliefs or presuppositions about the real world in terms of which questions about the significance of the universe are decided. This conception of reality also is the foundation for life's ideals and for principles of conduct. Thus, Dilthey believes that a Weltanschauung provides the means for systematically connecting one's view of reality with the practical life for both individuals and societies.

²Hodges, 86.

Dilthey thought that world views could be found as a feature of all human societies. He expressed this by comparing the phenomenon of world view to animal life.

Just as the earth is populated by countless species of animals among which there is carried on an unceasing struggle for existence and for space to expand, so the world of man knows a growth of structures of world views and a struggle between them for power over the minds of men.  

Dilthey proposed to subject world views to a comparative study. Thus, his Weltanschauungslehre concluded with a theory of the types of world view which one might find in human cultures. In brief, he thought there were three basic types which he characterized as religious, poetic, and metaphysical.

In the early years of the twentieth century scholars within the emerging discipline of cultural anthropology sought to make use of the philosopher's notion of a world view. Thus, in 1922, Bronislaw Malinowski, one of the early giants of ethnology, issued the following confession which is reminiscent of Dilthey's approach.

What interests me really in the study of the native is his outlook on things, his Weltanschauung, the breath of life and reality which he breathes and by which he lives. Every human culture gives its members a definite vision of the world, a definite zest for life. In the roamings over human history, and over the surface of the earth, it is the possibility of seeing life and the world from the various angles, peculiar

4Dilthey, Philosophy of Existence, 28.
to each culture, that has always charmed me most, and inspired me with real desire to penetrate other cultures, to understand other types of life. 5

Ruth Benedict, another of the influential cultural theorists from the formative years of anthropology, was more explicit about the similarity between her view and that of such philosophers as Dilthey and Spengler. Benedict held that cultures are not mere haphazard collections of artifacts and ideas. She believed that each society was integrated according to principles of order such that the resulting cultural system displayed distinguishable patterns or configurations. She thought that this doctrine of patterns was quite similar to Dilthey's concept of worldview.

The proposition that cultures must be studied from this point of view [as patterns] and that it is crucial in an understanding even of our own cultural history has been put forward by the German school headed by Wilhelm Dilthey and popularly represented in English-speaking countries by Oswald Spengler in his Untergang des Abendlandes (English translation: The Decline of the West. 2 vols. New York, 1929 and 1930). For this philosophical school, history is the succession of culturally organized philosophies of life, and philosophy is the study of these great readings of life. For Dilthey himself the emphasis is only secondarily and as it were accidentally on the configuration of culture itself to express these varied readings of life. 6

5 Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (New York, 1922), 517.
In the remainder of the article just quoted, Benedict set out to shift the emphasis to cultures as they expressed varied "readings of Life." This article was followed by her well known book, Patterns of Culture (Boston, 1934), in which she continued to develop the notion that culture is configurational. And again (Patterns of Culture, p. 52) she acknowledges the views of Dilthey.

In the social sciences the importance of integration and configuration was stressed in the last generation of Wilhelm Dilthey. His primary interest was in the great philosophies and interpretations of life. Especially in Die Typen der Weltanschauung he analyzes part of the history of thought to show the relativity of philosophical systems. He does not formulate as cultural the different attitudes he discusses, but because he takes for discussion great philosophical configurations, and historical periods like that of Frederick the Great, his work has led naturally to more and more conscious recognition of the role of culture.

7 One should not think, however, that the relationship between Dilthey and Benedict is that of master and disciple. The connection seems rather to be that of two sympathetic ways of approaching a common problem. This latter view is borne out by comments in Margaret Mead's book, An Anthropologist at Work: Writings of Ruth Benedict (Boston, 1959). Mead asserts: "The actual facts are that the theoretical part of the work [i.e., Patterns of Culture] ... was worked out with reference neither to Spengler nor to Dilthey" (p. 210). Later on, Mead adds: "As for Dilthey, far from battling for her individuality against Boas' disapproval of Dilthey, it was Boas who insisted that she must discuss him, not out of sympathy for Dilthey's ideas but out of the special standards of scholarship which required mention of those who had used comparable ideas irrespective of whether or not one's own ideas derived from them" (p. 211).
In 1946 Benedict also published *The Crysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*. I think it would be fair to describe this as a study of the Japanese world view.

Benedict's configurationist approach has continued to attract attention. For example, in a well known textbook, E. Adamson Hoebel has presented a view of the nature of culture which is allied with that advanced by Benedict. According to Hoebel, the customs and traditions which compose a culture are "selected" with reference to a deeply-lying set of postulates about the nature of man and the world. He distinguishes between existential postulates, which are assumptions about the nature of existence, and normative postulates, which are used in value judgments.

Both existential postulates and normative postulates are the reference points that color a people's view of things, giving them their orientation toward the world around them and toward each other. The basic postulates provide the frame of reference for a people's *Weltanschauung*, or world view.

2. The Redfield Circle

The configurationist approach as exemplified by Benedict has employed the concept of world view as a means for

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providing a theory of the nature of culture as a whole. There is a more recent tradition, beginning with the work of Robert Redfield, which considers the concept of world view as denoting only one portion of a society's cultural heritage. This school does not make use of the concept in order to develop theories of the nature of culture, except insofar as a culture's world view is regarded as a cultural phenomenon. There seems to be only a tenuous connection between the group beginning with Redfield and what I have called the configurationist school. Furthermore, among members of Redfield's circle, there seems to be no recognition of the contributions made by philosophers such as Dilthey.\textsuperscript{10} E. M. Mendelson, a scholar in the Redfield tradition, has even gone so far as to say that "outside Redfield's circle, little use has been made of the concept of world view."\textsuperscript{11} The kindest thing one could say

\textsuperscript{10} However, Redfield for one, was not free of any influences from philosophically trained scholars. Redfield was influenced by the work of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, a colleague at the University of Chicago in the 1930's. Radcliffe-Brown had been trained in philosophy, and had written a famous ethnography, The Andaman Islanders (Cambridge, 1922) in parts of which something like a concept of world view is implied, although he does not use that exact phrase (see p. 385). Cf. Robert A. Georges, Studies on Mythology (Homewood, Ill., 1968), 7-10, 237.

about this claim by Mendelson is that it is patently myopic. Redfield was not this near-sighted, for he mentions the work of Benedict, F. S. C. Northrop, Radin, and Whorf. Redfield seemed to be especially impressed with the work of Clyde Kluckhohn, for in *The Little Community* (pp. 88-89) he wrote the following:

Clyde Kluckhohn has written: "Speculation and reflection upon the nature of things and of man's place in the total scheme of things have been carried out in every known culture. Every people has its characteristic set of 'primitive postulates.'" And in the paper from which I quote these words Professor Kluckhohn gives an account of the world view, although he does not use that term, of the Navaho Indians, a people he has studied long and well. The account is of the way Navaho conceive experience and things, of all sorts. It gives the "implicit philosophy" -- the "underlying

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premisses," the "laws of thought" -- again his words.13

The notion of world view first surfaced briefly in Redfield's writing in *The Folk Culture of Yucatan* (Chicago, 1941, chapter 5).14 He followed up this sketchy account with an article in 1952 entitled "The Primitive World View."15 This article appeared again in revised form as chapter five of his book, *The Primitive World and Its Transformations* (Ithaca, New York, 1953). In describing Redfield's conception of world view, later students often note one of these two formulations. Thus, commentators such as Dundes, Foster, and Hallowell16 have quoted

13 The article by Kluckhohn to which Redfield refers here is: "The Philosophy of the Navaho Indians," in *Ideological Differences and World Order*, ed. F. S. C. Northrop (New Haven, 1949), 356-384. It is worth noting that the phrase "laws of thought," as used in the above passage, seems somewhat out of place, at least if this phrase means what it traditionally signifies within philosophy: namely, the basic laws of logic, usually said to be the "laws" of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle. Concerning these "laws," see Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, *Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (New York, 1934), 181-187.

14 Sol Tax, in "World View and Social Relationships in Guatemala," *American Anthropologist*, 43 (1941), 27-42, had mentioned world view in a very summary fashion. In later articles, Redfield and his students (e.g., Mendelson in his article on world view for the *Encyclopedia of Social Science*) often trace their use of the term to this article by Tax.


parts of the following as representing Redfield's use of the term 'world view'.

"World view" differs from culture, ethos, mode of thought, and national character. It is the picture the members of a society have of the properties and characters upon their stage of action. While "national character" refers to the way these people look to the outsider looking in on them, "world view" refers to the way the world looks to that people looking out. Of all that is connoted by "culture," "world view" attends especially to the way a man, in a particular society, sees himself in relation to all else. It is the properties of existence as distinguished from and related to the self. It is, in short, a man's idea of the universe. It is that organization of ideas which answers to a man the questions: Where am I? Among what do I move? What are my relations to these things? . . . Self is the axis of world view.17

If one simply leaves it at that, it would seem that Redfield is contrasting world view with what he calls modes of thought (or the object of studies of cognition within cultures), and that he is characterizing world views as somehow uniquely based upon the concept of the self. But it seems odd that in what purports to be a description of the concept of world view, there is no mention of some notion such as category, postulate, presupposition, or the like. Almost every scholar examined thus far has felt the need


17 Proceedings, 30.
for such terms. Even the passage noted above makes use of the phrase "organization of ideas" which is certainly epistemological in tone and not too far away from concepts like postulate or presupposition. And that kind of language does seem to involve what might reasonably be called "modes of cognition."

This matter was cleared up by Redfield himself in a later discussion of world view.

It is the attention to the native's conceptions of the cognitive along with the normative and the affective that distinguishes the world view from other conceptions for describing the whole reality. World view is the philosopher's approach to the whole. In attempting to describe a little community in terms of world view the outsider withholds his suggestions for systematizing that whole until he has heard from the natives. The outsider waits. He listens to hear if one or many of the natives have themselves conceived an order in the whole. It is their order, their categories, their emphasis upon this part rather than that which the student listens for. Every world view is made of the stuff of philosophy, the nature of all things and their interrelations, and it is the native philosopher whose ordering of the stuff to which we, the outside investigators, listen. 

Thus it is clear that Redfield finally overtly incorporates "category" into his schema, a concept bearing close resemblance to "presupposition" or "postulate." For, as Redfield uses it here, the term does not appear to mean something like a class or division in a scheme of classification (as in "George is a Category I semi-finalist in the Balzac Essay Competition"). Instead, the sense the

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18 The Little Community (Chicago, 1955), 88.
word has here seems to be close to Kant’s employment in which it refers to "principles of understanding" by means of which perceptions are ordered into meaningful judgements. Roughly put, the term when used in this manner means "the principles by means of which experience is organized." As a further indication that Redfield would accept something like "postulate" or "presupposition" as the basic elements in a world view, remember that he quoted with admiration Kluckhohn’s earlier paper dealing with the implicit “primitive postulates” which Kluckhohn believed to be the building blocks of a society’s world view or philosophy. It seems clear that Redfield adopted something like Kluckhohn’s position because, in describing a possible method for eliciting a culture’s world view, he states:

We might mean by "world view" or Weltanschauung the total inside view of a cultural community as it is learned about and assembled by the student on the outside of that community. In describing the world view, the student would take account of such categories of experience as he finds implicit in the conduct and language of the native, whether or not the natives as a whole state these categories to themselves.

Thus, it is misleading to suggest, as Dundes, Foster, and

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19 By the way, I am sure that Kluckhohn did not mean primitive in the sense of "cultural aboriginal," but in the sense of "logically given or basic."

20 Cf. The Little Community, 94, in which Redfield notes with approval similar work by F. S. C. Northrop.

21 The Little Community, 91.
Hallowell appear to do, that Redfield held that world views are somehow uniquely based upon the notion of self. That concept may be relevant in some way, but in Redfield's later thought, the idea of "primitive postulate" appears as the principal foundation of his theory of the nature of world views.

Furthermore, on the basis of these comments, we can see that Foster misreads Redfield on another point, for Foster claims that Redfield's basic interpretation of "world view" remained unchanged throughout all his writings on the concept, and that Redfield held that world view was the "consciously cognitive orientation of the individual [native] with respect to his social and natural universe."22 That Foster is mistaken about the former point can be seen in the progression I have just noted. And he is surely wrong concerning the latter point -- that much can be seen from the last quotation I cited from Redfield.23

22 Foster, 386, emphasis added.
23 See also, The Little Community, 91-92, for other comments which show that Redfield clearly thought that some of the elements of a world view were consciously formulated by natives and that other elements were to be made explicit by the ethnologist based upon the "categories of experience" which were unconscious for natives, and which must be seen by the ethnologist as implicitly displayed in native word and deed.
Concerning this issue as to whether or not a world view is consciously held by the natives under study, one brief but important criticism should be mentioned at this point. Among most of the scholars mentioned above, there is considerable agreement that it is typical that the "postulates" which make up a world view are implicitly held. However, many of these same writers also exhibit a tendency to use the term 'philosophy' as a virtually synonymous means for discussing what is otherwise described using the term 'world view'. I should like to preserve a distinction between the phenomenon known as philosophy and that designated as world view. The chief difference lies in the great extent to which basic "assumptions" or "postulates" are consciously and carefully subjected to criticism in the practice of philosophy. Whereas, although a world view may be constituted by similar "postulates," "assumptions," or "premisses," there is normally no conscious or self-aware criticism of them on the part of the person having this world view. Instead, he makes use of these "premisses" in his day-to-day life. It is true that a philosopher will also have a personal set of "premisses" which he employs in living his life, but ideally these will also be the result of reflection and criticism. On the other hand, a person's world view does not ordinarily pass through such a process -- one usually does not choose one's world view. To make this distinction
clearer, consider that a student of philosophy could have (and some probably do have) both a philosophy and a world view, the former the result of careful study, the latter an inheritance from the social system in which he grew to adulthood.

The presence or lack of criticism in this case has far-reaching importance. Consider that in the tradition of philosophy there is an awareness of competing philosophical systems within academic history. And philosophers do not only study philosophies within their tradition; because of their access to and use of critical tools, they are able to accomplish many things not normally associated with a nonacademic context. For example, they can bring to light implicit world views so that they may be held up to study, criticism, and comparison. Philosophy is also noted for its conscious demand for consistency, detail, precision, and comprehensiveness. On the other hand, concerning world views, it is not unusual to find a good deal of what is known as "compartmentalized thinking." There is generally an absence of any tradition of critically comparing and assessing rival approaches -- indeed, there is often no realization that there are rival approaches. Consequently there is little awareness of most of the kinds of detailed problems the philosopher undertakes to consider. Moreover, alternative approaches are often rejected out of hand because they are not acceptable to an
entrenched orthodoxy. Here one simply compares new experiences with the orthodox truth, rejecting without consideration those which are noncongenial. This is directly opposed to the philosopher's ideal of maintaining an "open mind." I do not now say that all this is either good or bad. I wish only to describe the situation as it is. Because of these kinds of factors, I believe that it is important to enforce a distinction between philosophy and world view. Also, if we did not keep such a distinction in mind, it would be self-defeating for us to make explicit and to submit to study the putatively implicit "postulates" of a world view, for it is by means of philosophical criticism that this process is accomplished.

3. The Role of Philosophy in World View Studies

The noted anthropologist, Melville Jacobs, in a recent discussion of world view studies, states:

A familiar German word for this multifaceted sector [world view] of a cultural heritage is

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24 A more detailed exposition of this general point concerning the differences between philosophy and world view can be seen in C. D. Broad, "Two Lectures on the Nature of Philosophy," in Clarity Is Not Enough, ed. H. D. Lewis (London, 1963), 42-75, see especially Lecture Two. Although the authors do not use the term 'world view' (Broad does not use it either), the same points are made within a historical perspective in Harry K. Girvetz et al., Science, Folklore, and Philosophy (New York, 1966), see particularly the Introduction.
Weltanschauung. What does it mean in its many components? How do they operate in people's lives? Philosophers' definitions and discussions need not detain an anthropologist. . . .

While it may be true in many instances that philosophers' discussions need not detain an anthropologist in his work, I believe that such a dictum does not hold in this case. "World view" is clearly a philosophical concept, one which students of world view studies have borrowed from philosophers or which has been proposed by such students who are philosophically inclined. That much should be clear from the foregoing historical survey. Furthermore, the critical techniques of the discipline of philosophy are required in making world views explicit and in comparing them or otherwise studying them. Thus, as David Bidney has indicated, in order for world view studies to succeed, one will require either cooperation from philosophers or philosophically trained social scientists.

One of the important tasks of the student of metaethnology is the investigation of the basic, logically primitive assumptions as to the nature of the world and of man involved in any one given cultural system. The task of rendering explicit these fundamental ontological postulates and assumptions is said to be metaethnological, since the reality with which the investigator is here concerned is metacultural, that is, it is presupposed as given and ultimate by the adherents of any given culture, as something to which their empirical cultural institutions and behavior must

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conform with which it must reckon, rather than as the product of their own creation. . . . The analysis of the metacultural postulates of a given culture, whether deductively inferred or intuitively conceived, is essentially a philosophical, or metaanthropological, undertaking and as necessary a part of anthropological science as is the collecting of empirical data. To appreciate properly the philosophy of life and Weltanschauung which serve as leitmotifs for a given culture requires some measure of philosophical discipline and insight, which necessitates that there be professionally trained philosophers working in the social sciences as well as philosophically minded social scientists.26

However, while it is true that there is a difference between philosophies and world views such that by means of critical techniques, a philosophically trained scholar can submit world views to study, there is an important similarity between the two, a similarity which probably accounts for the tendency of students of world view to equate them. This similarity will also, I believe, be seen as another reason why the discipline of philosophy is particularly relevant to the study of world views. A philosophical theory or stance or system is constituted by "assumptions," or "presuppositions," or "postulates." A world view, according to the scholars considered above, is similarly said to be constituted of "primitive postulates," "axioms," "tenets," "implicit premisses," "themes," "patterns," "categories," or "presuppositions." Thus,

there is agreement here, although admittedly vaguely defined agreement--witness the large lexicon of similar terms which various students of world view have employed in attempting to describe this common feature. The agreement lies in the view that the "building blocks" of both philosophy and world view are somewhat similar, each writer, of course, having a preferred name for the "blocks."

If I am right about this similarity, then (taking into account my comments about the difference between philosophy and world view) one could say (roughly) that world view names a set of these "blocks" as they are in use (normally a non-selfconscious use) in actual life situations, whereas philosophy includes the selfaware criticism of such "blocks." So, since the basic parts of a world view are approximately the same phenomena that make up basic parts of a philosophy, it is again appropriate that world views should be studied by philosophers or philosophically inclined anthropologists or folklorists.

In accordance with the intentions announced in my introductory comments, I propose to drastically diminish the number of terms in the somewhat large lexicon which students of world view studies have favored ("postulate," "tenet," and so on) in attempting to describe the "building blocks" of world views. I shall urge that the best theory for the nature of world views is one that would identify the phenomenon to which this long list of terms
refers as being belief. This would mean that a world view is a system of beliefs which are largely implicit. Belief is the sort of thing which can be either implicit or explicit. Whereas, many of the terms favored by students of world view are not the type of thing which, in the central use of the term, is normally implicit. For example, 'postulate', 'axiom', and 'premiss' are terms which have their basic use in logic or mathematics; and there they refer to propositions or sentences which have an explicit status in some system. Thus, to apply the qualifier "implicit" to such terms seems to border on self-contradiction. Perhaps this is a minor quibble, but when one asks, "What non-selfcontradictory meaning for these terms was intended by the authors?" a reasonable answer would be that they were attempting to get at something on the order of a belief which has a particular status, its status being that it is a basic, unquestioned belief within a wider system of beliefs, some of which are open to question. That is, "implicit postulate" and similar locutions, can be seen as metaphors used to suggest that the status of a particular belief in a given world view is comparable with the status that a postulate or axiom has within a system of logic or within something like Euclid's Geometry. This interpretation of phrases such as "implicit postulate" avoids the taint of selfcontradiction while preserving a perfectly sensible metaphorical meaning.
In proceeding to fill in the details of my conjecture that world views are composed of beliefs, I shall also want to consider the systematic aspect. By this I refer to the web of relations (over and above the system's components which are thereby brought into relationships) which comprise a system. The elements of a world view are beliefs, but just having some beliefs would not result in having a world view, for such beliefs must be interrelated, some beliefs being more important than others. In order to readily identify my position so that it may be separated from those I will be discussing, it will be useful to supply some new terminology. For one, I shall adopt the term 'principium' (plural, 'principia') as a handy means for characterizing the basic, most important beliefs in a world view. 27 I begin my detailed account of the nature of world views by taking up the task of giving a fairly complete account of the nature of a principium. At bottom, of course, it is a belief. But I must also supply a description of the systematic, or relational features, which serve to convey the status a principium will enjoy within its system.

I shall initiate the discussion of principia with an examination of R. G. Collingwood's theory of the nature of

27 This general use of the term is not original with me -- see: Jose Ortega Y Gasset, Concord and Liberty (New York, 1946), 159-60; Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Delta.
metaphysics. Collingwood holds that metaphysics

... is no futile attempt at knowing what lies
beyond the limits of experience, but is pri-
mainly at any given time an attempt to discover
what the people of that time believe about the
world's general nature. ... Secondarily, it is
the attempt to discover the corresponding presup-
positions of other peoples and other times, and
to follow the historical process by which one set
of presuppositions has turned into another.28

Collingwood urges that one's view of the world's "general
nature" can be described in terms of the presuppositions
one holds to be "absolute." This has several points of
similarity with what I have just summarized from world
view studies, with such terms as 'primitive postulate' cor-
responding to a Collingwoodian absolute presupposition.

Of course, metaphysics, as he sees it, is not completely
comparable with world views, for (as I have noted) meta-
physics, being a part of philosophy, is a conscious criti-
cal discipline, whereas world view is not. Instead, one
could correctly say that world view studies is a depart-
ment within what Collingwood calls metaphysics, since
world view studies is a critical discipline which studies
"primitive postulates" (what Collingwood prefers to describe
as "absolute presuppositions"). It is appropriate to be-

presuppositions, I shall be building an account of the nature of principia, a considerable part of my description of the nature of world views. 29

In those aspects of Collingwood's approach which require emendation or supplementation, I shall draw heavily upon the position taken by Charles Sanders Peirce, particularly that phase of his philosophy which he called Critical Common-Sensism. 30 I should also mention that I will not be especially interested in developing a detailed emendation of Peirce's work, whereas in the case of my

29 Of course, the topic of first principles has been widely discussed in all periods of philosophy. The following list represents examples of some of the better work on this general problem: Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated by John Warrington (New York, 1956); Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Cambridge, 1969); Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (London, 1963); Ernest Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (New Haven, 1953); Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Oxford, 1969).

30 References to Peirce's writings will be in two formats. First, there are the published Collected Papers (Cambridge, 1965) which I shall abbreviate as 'CP'. References to CP will be in decimal format: e.g., 5.20 would refer to CP volume 5, paragraph 20. Second, I shall have occasion to refer to some of Peirce's unpublished writings from the microfilm edition of the Peirce manuscripts available from Harvard University Library. In citing such manuscripts I will give the manuscript number and the page number according to Peirce's pagination (which is somewhat irregular at times). For example, MS 281, p. 4 would refer to manuscript number 281, Peirce's page 4. The numbering of unpublished Peirce manuscripts follows a system arranged by Richard S. Robin in his Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce (Amherst, 1967).
comments upon Collingwood, I will have that kind of interest. I shall be working from within the spirit of Peirce's philosophy as I understand it; I will not be particularly concerned with developing such an understanding in this essay.

These remarks should be sufficient preparation for what is to come, so instead of further talk about the main project, I shall begin it by considering Collingwood's treatment of the important concept, "presupposition."
CHAPTER II

ON PRESUPPOSING

Since my first goal, in dealing with Collingwood, is to come to have a grasp of his theory of absolute presuppositions, this chapter, in which I carefully consider the nature of presupposing, is a necessary prerequisite. After getting these details settled, it will be possible to go on to consider absolute presuppositions in the next chapter.

In order to get a preliminary idea of Collingwood's intentions in using 'presupposition', consider the following characterization which introduces a chapter entitled "On Presupposing" in his An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford, 1940).

Whenever anybody states a thought in words, there are a great many more thoughts in his mind than there are expressed in his statement. Among these there are some which stand in a peculiar relation to the thought he has stated; they are not merely its context, they are its presuppositions.¹

The term 'presuppose' is quite common in contemporary academic discussion, and one should not immediately assume that Collingwood's use of the word is identical with any one of these.² In what follows I shall urge that

¹An Essay on Metaphysics (hereafter cited as EM), 21.
²An article which provides a helpful summary of some of the more frequent meanings for the word is Vergil H. Dykstra, "Philosophers and Presuppositions," Mind, 69 (1960), 63-68.
Collingwoodian presupposition is more comparable to what has been called contextual implication\(^3\) rather than to many of the various senses of 'presupposition' known today. Roughly stated, my argument shall be that Collingwood uses the term to refer to a relation standing between a communicative act and its context rather than to refer to some unique entity that is a presupposition \textit{sui generis}. That is, I shall stress the contextual nature of the phenomenon Collingwood calls 'presupposing'. Then I shall attempt to show that my interpretation provides a basis for gaining a clearer understanding of his doctrine of absolute presuppositions. That, in turn, will provide the groundwork for my account of principia and their role within world views.

1. Collingwood's Study of Questioning

Collingwood developed his fundamental notion of presupposition within the context of his remarks on questioning. His account of the relationship between presupposing and questioning is presented principally in chapter two of the \textit{Essay}\(^4\) by means of a series of propounded

\(^3\)See Isabel Hungerland, "Contextual Implication," \textit{Inquiry}, 3 (1960), 211-258. As my discussion unfolds, a debt to Hungerland's view will be apparent.

\(^4\)The topic of questioning appears at two other points in Collingwood's work: \textit{An Autobiography} (Oxford, 1939); \textit{Speculum Mentis} (Oxford, 1924), 76-80. However, the notion of presupposing is not mentioned in either of these two works, at least not in conjunction with his remarks on
propositions and definitions with a running commentary, in much the same "geometrical" style favored by Spinoza, although I am sure that in Collingwood's case it is merely a stylistic device (see EM, 67-68). Proposition two (EM, 25) states: "Every question involves a presupposition." In the commentary one learns more about the crucial term 'presupposition.' First, any single question directly or immediately involves just one presupposition. Second, this presupposition may in turn have other presuppositions which are thus said to be indirect presuppositions of the original question. That is, the immediate presupposition of a particular question could itself be an answer for another question which, of course (according to proposition two), also has just one immediate presupposition. An example similar to one Collingwood uses (see EM, 27) might be helpful here. In examining an excavation an archaeologist could ask: "Does this mark mean 'man'?" The immediate presupposition of this question would be that this mark means something. This presupposition is in turn an answer to the question "Is this mark part of this piece of writing?" And the last question immediately presupposes questioning. Furthermore, the material in the Essay appears to cover all the points mentioned in these earlier works. So, I shall depend primarily upon the Essay as a source for Collingwood's view on the relationship between questioning and presupposing.
that this is a piece of writing. But the direct or immediate presupposition of the latter question would be, according to Collingwood, an indirect presupposition of the first question.

This example I have used is a question of the form "Is X a Y?" There are other question-forms, for instance, "What is X?" or "Why is X?" or "How is X?" I propose to establish a somewhat broad distinction between the former kind of question (questions having both a subject and predicate) and the kind represented here by the latter three cases (questions with a subject and an "open" predicate position). Questions such as "What is X?" I shall call unsaturated. In describing unsaturated questions, I shall use only the "what" case, leaving it to the reader to fill in the similar details in the case of questions using words such as "why" or "how." "What is X?" is a request for (or an indication of the lack of) knowledge about X. This can be more easily seen if we transpose the question to the equivalent form, "X is ___?" In other words, the questioner desires that the blank be filled correctly. Note that there are usually a large number of responses which could possibly fill this blank. This empty "slot" which the questioner wants "filled" is what characterizes unsaturated questions. On the other hand, I would describe "Is X a Y?" as being a saturated question, since there are no slots or blanks which need to be
"filled" -- the answer can be given as either "yes" or "no." Furthermore, saturated questions can, in many cases, be viewed as instances of unsaturated questions which have the empty slot "filled," although they remain as questions because the empty slot is not filled with confidence, as it were. Thus, one might first ask, "What is X?" which means "X is ___?" followed by a thought that X could be Y, so the further question, "Is X a Y?" is posed in order to find out the correct answer (i.e., whether X is Y or X is not Y). If it is correct that X is not Y, the process is often repeated with a new candidate whereby the original question can become correctly saturated. In discussing questioning, Collingwood uses both saturated and unsaturated questions as examples. It is clear that his theory of presupposing is meant to be applicable to both kinds. For the most part, however, I shall be discussing saturated questions since that fits my purpose.

The fact that something causes a particular question to "arise" Collingwood calls the thing's "logical efficacy." He does not define this notion clearly, although he does provide a few comments about it. The supposition that p is said to have the same logical efficacy as a statement that p (EM, 27). Assumptions (suppositions which are consciously made for the sake of argument) and presuppositions (which are another kind of supposition) also have logical efficacy. This property or aspect of
assumptions, suppositions, and presuppositions does not depend upon their being true or upon their being thought true, but only upon their being supposed. Collingwood claims that there are clear examples of this last point in both everyday life and in the conduct of science (EM, 28): "where it is possible and often profitable to argue from suppositions which we know to be false, or which we believe to be false, or concerning which we have neither knowledge nor belief as to whether they are false or true."

There is one aspect of Collingwood's work on the nature of questioning which could easily be overlooked. And it is the fact that his line of research is directed by a particular outlook. He is investigating what might be called normal and serious occasions of questioning. His aim, as I see it, is to present a characterization of how such occasions or acts can be successful. I have found no passages in which Collingwood expressly states that this is his research goal; however, there are a few suggestive comments from which one can infer that he is intent upon studying what constitutes a normal act of questioning.  

Just prior to discussing the series of "propositions" through which he propounds his theory, Collingwood warns (EM, 23): "I shall not be trying to convince the reader of anything, but only to remind him of what he already knows perfectly well." In introducing the notion of the presuppositions of a question, he states that (EM, 25, my emphasis) "ordinarily a question involves large numbers of them." See also p. 172 and p. 185 for similar comments. These utterances are somewhat vague, but they do provide
But in the main I must rest my case for this claim about Collingwood's goal upon the kinds of tactics that he employs in his method of work upon the "logical" nature of questioning. He makes the kinds of "moves" one would expect if he were interested in analysing the normal context. Specifically, his technique revolves around discovering what look like necessary conditions for the successful occurrence of normal questioning as a form of communication. In what I have sketched above, he has claimed that a question cannot be "logically" asked unless its immediate presupposition has been made. He expresses this in a metaphor by saying that without its immediate presupposition, a question "does not arise." 'Can't be asked logically' and 'does not arise' in these uses seem to make the best sense when interpreted as being expressive of some abnormality in the communicative context, an abnormality which is caused by the lack of a necessary condition, or (to be more accurate) caused by the lack of a condition which is present in a successful normal question (what I am describing as abnormality is, I believe, rather like what some contemporary philosophers, such as Gilbert Ryle, call "oddness"). Collingwood's admission that "verbally" a question can be asked without presupposing anything would

some explicit textual evidence for my contention that Collingwood's principal intention is to examine questioning as it occurs in normal contexts of "thought."
then mean that although such an expression might be grammatically correct, it would not be normal. This comment of his serves, by the way, to indicate another necessary condition of questioning, namely that the linguistic expression of a question must be grammatically correct. Consider also the term 'logical efficacy'. If one interprets the phrase 'this question arises' as meaning (in part, at least) that a particular questioning act is successful and normal, then to say that a presupposition is logically efficacious in causing a question to arise would be a way of referring to the putative fact that in normally composing such an act of communication this presupposition has an important and indispensable function.

There is one other aspect of Collingwood's discussion of questions which deserves attention. A fairly strong case can be made that he is talking about questions which are raised for the purpose of informing the questioner. It is clear that Collingwood's theory of presupposing is based upon what occurs within the conduct of what he calls "high-grade" or "scientific" thinking. He stresses this throughout the discussion of presupposing. If a man is thinking scientifically when he makes a statement, (EM, 24) "he knows that his statement is the answer to a question and knows what that question is." High-grade thinking also depends upon an increase in mental effort. Collingwood describes that in this manner.
Increase of mental effort brings about not only a difference of degree in the intensity of thinking but also a difference of kind in its quality. At the lowest level of intensity, as we have seen, one is conscious only of 'intuiting' or 'apprehending' what presents itself to one's mind. To say that it presents itself to one's mind is only a way of saying that one thinks about it without noticeable effort. When one becomes aware of effort, one becomes aware of a mental hunger that is no longer satisfied by what swims into one's mouth. One wants what is not there and will not come of itself. One swims about hunting for it. This ranging of the mind in search of its prey is called asking questions. 6

The final sentence of the paragraph quoted above suggests another point about raising a question in order to get information. That sentence could be taken as a claim that questioning for the purpose of becoming informed is the central kind of questioning upon which all questions for other purposes are conceptually dependent. For example, one can ask questions to stimulate another person to think, or one could ask a question in order to amuse someone. In neither of these two cases does one ask the question for the purpose of getting information. Yet such cases seem to make sense only if one understands that the central case is questioning in order to be informed. I take Collingwood to be saying that what we call questioning in the basic and central sense is questioning in which we are in search of "prey." I conclude from this that the kind of presupposing Collingwood discusses here occurs within the

6 EM, 37.
conduct of "scientific" thinking which he believes is asking questions for the purpose of gaining information. Furthermore, I believe that he regards questioning undertaken for that purpose to be the central and standard kind of questioning upon which questioning for other purposes is conceptually dependent. 7

Collingwood apparently thought that the account of questioning I have just summarized was sufficient to make clear his basic concept of presupposing. But there are grounds for claiming that he did not succeed completely. For one thing, Collingwood is not explicit about the nature of the relationship between a question and the phenomenon he calls its presupposition. In the second place, he did not fully explicate the means by which one can come to say that thus-and-so is the presupposition of a particular question; he only notes that it is done by a "kind of analysis" (EM, 22). I attribute the lack of these details to a pair of factors. First, Collingwood has placed an undue reliance upon unexplained metaphors in developing his

7 The Peircean analogue to Collingwood's "scientific thinking" is "inquiry." Peirce's classic discussion of inquiry is in CP, 5.374-387. For Peirce, inquiry is a form of rational self-control. On reasoning and self-control, see the following representative passages: MS 288, pp. 27-33; CP 5.418-420, 5.440-441. Compare "logic of question and answer" (Collingwood) with "inquiry" (Peirce) in the light of a very common use of 'inquire'; for example, "He was inquiring about your health," or "The purpose of this inquiry is to discover whether there is any truth in Smith's allegations."
view. Second, I suspect that part of the reason his comments are vague is that he did not fully carry out the aims of his research program. He fell short of his mark because he did not grasp the full import of the task he had set for himself. This is not unusual in the work of a pioneer in a new area or style of inquiry. If my interpretation of the nature of his work is correct, Collingwood would be just such an innovator in the study of the philosophical aspects of communication; for example, there are similarities between Collingwood's view and the work of contemporary scholars who are interested in studying "speech acts."  

It will be necessary to fill these gaps in Collingwood's approach if his view is to make good sense in conjunction with studying the world views of other cultures. Therefore, I shall suggest an improved schema for presupposing. I believe the best way to do that would be to follow Collingwood's general guidelines for research as I understand them. Within that kind of approach, I shall first develop a revised, though admittedly limited, model for questioning.

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2. A Model for Questioning.

This model will be limited in two senses. First, there is an obvious lack of space for fully treating such a topic in a work of this nature and scope. Second, because my goal is to make Collingwoodian presupposition more understandable, I need present only those aspects of questioning which I think to be necessary to that end.

What follows is the result of reflecting upon questions of the form "Is X a Y?" I choose to discuss this kind of question because the examples with which I shall later deal fall under this type. Furthermore, I believe that a knowledge of the way in which saturated questions are structured can easily be used to illuminate the logic of unsaturated questions because the former seem to be somewhat more complex in arrangement. The model is based upon several general assumptions. I presume that the object of study is what (on my interpretation) Collingwood might agree is the central case in questioning, that which is undertaken by the questioner in order to be informed by the respondent. I also stipulate that the question be serious and successful. In addition I am presuming that the normal conditions of communication for this kind of act are in effect. I am considering this example as an instance of questioning which occurs within the context of interpersonal communication. In order to account for questioning as it occurs within intrapersonal dialogue (self-dialogue) some
modifications would have to be made, although I do not believe that they would be very extensive. With these points in mind, here are notes on some of the more important aspects of such questioning as I see them from the standpoint of a questioner (abbreviated 'Q'), one who articulates the question.

Q1. There is, or Q establishes, a questioning context. Interrogative sentence form is obviously important as a context indicator. Such things as the speaker’s manner and the nature of the immediate environment are examples of factors one could also cite as being relevant to the establishment of the context. The situation and the context indicators serve also to convey that Q is asking the question because he wants to be informed.

Q2. Suppositions about the subject of the question.

a. Q has an understanding of the subject, X. I list this as a supposition because this understanding is composed of one or more suppositions about X which can be roughly described as "how Q is characterizing X." The exact content of this understanding of the subject is dependent upon what words make up the subject and what Q's degree of familiarity is with them. To use Collingwood's

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9One might think that obvious counterexamples to this condition (Q2a) are questions which are asked in order to get information about how to understand X: for example,
example, one uttering the question "Does this mark mean 'man'?" would understand the subject "this mark" (if he didn't understand it at all and just uttered the sounds, it would not be a genuine question, or in Collingwood's terms, it would be "merely verbal"). Unless there is some indication to the contrary, one's understanding of the subject of a question of this type will also include a supposition to the effect that there is such a thing as X. By the phrase "some indication to the contrary" I mean that some aspect of the situation serves to show that an existential supposition is inappropriate for this act of questioning.

For example, one could ask "Are unicorns white?" Here the word 'unicorn' along with one part of its standard meaning (namely, "beast which does not exist") is the indication that no existential supposition is being made. Another interesting kind of case is that in which the overall speech situation carries with it an openness concerning the existence of the subject. One sometimes encounters this in science; for instance, physicists are (or were) debating

"Is a riskleng a kosher pickle or a Japanese tea ceremony -- just what the heck is it?" I accept this as being a request for information concerning how to further understand X, but surely even in such questions Q2a must be satisfied if the question is normal. This is the case because questions like the "riskleng" example amount to asking "Is the meaning of 'X' Y?" Q2a applies here, for anyone seriously asking it in the normal way must understand its subject, "the meaning of 'X'," which in this case would involve such suppositions as "'X' is a meaningful word in some language."
the properties of "quarks" without being at all sure whether such things actually exist. One could put this in alter-
nate terms: often in an inquiry one must ask whether some concept has an actual referent, and one accomplishes this through the very kind of question under consideration here.

b. Q supposes that it is at least possible that R (the respondent, the person to whom Q directs the question) knows of X. This is the minimum state; very often one is quite sure that R knows X. If Q did not think that there was at least a possibility that R knew of X's, it would not make much sense for him to ask R about X's. He would prefer instead to ask someone he thinks might know of X.

Q3. Suppositions about the predicate of the question.

a. Q understands what it is for something to have the predicate Y. Typically this consists of one or more suppositions which serve to characterize Y. Again using Collingwood's example, "Does this mark mean 'man'?", one uttering this question would understand the predicate "mean 'man'". If he didn't have this understanding, the charge of "merely verbal" would apply. On the assumption that Q is using standard English, Q's understanding of this predicate would be characterized as expressing or signifying the usual sense of the word 'man'.
b. Q supposes that it is at least possible that R knows about Y. Without this supposition Q would direct his question to someone other than R.

Q4. Concerning the questioning mode. To this point, much of what I have said about X and Y could be the case and we still would not have a question at hand. That is, one could have a conception or understanding of X and of Y while not conceiving them as subject and predicate in a question. In describing X, for example, as the subject of the question, I have been taking it for granted that the questioner has already placed X and Y together in a question. I must now make this assumption explicit by describing what constitutes the juxtaposition of X and Y as a question. In other words, I must give an account of the questioning mode since Q is indicating (Q1) that he is asking a question.

a. First, Q supposes that in the response to his question, Y will either be affirmed or denied as a predicate of X. That is, Q is able to imagine as possible responses (is able to conceive to be intelligible as responses) both (A) "X is Y" and (B) "X is not Y."

b. Q supposes that just one of the two possible responses (A and B) is in actuality correct. That is, Q supposes that either (I) A is correct and B is incorrect or (II) B is correct and A is incorrect, but not both.
c. Although Q may feel quite strongly that one of these alternatives (I and II) is quite probable (quite plausibly true, quite likely to be true) and the other is rather improbable, Q must suppose that each of these two options is a "live" option. To state this condition in other words, Q must suppose that each of the two responses (A and B) is in some sense possible or intelligible as a correct response to the question and that (at least minimally) there is something in favor of both A and B. Or, if we gloss "answer" as "correct response to the question," then we can describe this condition as Q's supposition that either A or B could be the answer.  

10 Collingwood has a discussion of this point. See EM, ch. 28. This condition (Q4c) has some bearing on Collingwood's observation that certain questions do not "arise" in one historical period or in a particular culture, but do come to be asked at a later period, or at a later development of a culture because of new experiences or cultural contacts or the like. For example, biologists at one time did not ask the question "Are birds descendants of reptiles?" even though they possessed all the concepts which are found in that question. They were led to ask this question partly because of the new experience represented by the discovery of the fossilized Archeopteryx which possessed both reptilian and avian characteristics. But in the period in which special creation and the immutability of species were held to be correct, there would be a wide gap between concepts like "bird" and "reptile," at least within the context of their biological antecedents. With the advent of well-developed theories of evolution of the species, a step which involved modifications in the assumptions biologists had about the possible historical interrelationships of species, it became more likely that a question of the kind in my example would be asked, given the discovery of such a fossil. Indeed, until the evolutionist era, the discovery of Archeopteryx would probably be accounted for in some way consistent with the theory of
believe that these conditions (Q4a-c) are quite close to the core of Peirce's characterization of "true" or "genuine" doubt. 11

d. In asking the question, Q does not know whether A is correct or B is correct, and Q wants (desires, wishes, is motivated) to know (wants to be told) which of special creation, a move which would militate against this particular question's serious occurrence.

11 The following two passages are fairly typical of the way Peirce characterizes genuine doubt. "... Two different and inconsistent lines of action offer themselves. His action [i.e., the questioner's action] is in imagination (or perhaps really) brought to a stop because he does not know whether (so to speak) the right hand road or the left hand road is the one that will bring him to his destination; and (to continue the figure of speech) he waits at the fork for an indication..." CP 5.510. "We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence, this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception and not real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up." CP 5.265.

I take it that things which it does not occur to us can be questioned are things toward which we do not hold supposition Q4c, primarily. I think it would be an accurate paraphrase of Peirce's comments to state that belief is the matrix from which doubt arises in that there must be some conflict between two things both of which one takes as intelligible and both of which one is inclined to believe to some extent. Furthermore, doubt logically requires the presence of certain beliefs: for example, the conflicting responses in a doubt require reference to a single object (whether an actual object or a concept), otherwise, there would be no source for the conflicting or contradictory responses. Hence, doubting requires a belief in the reality of the subject of the sentence expressing the doubt (cf. Q2).
those two alternatives is correct. In the absence of this kind of motivation, the question might be uttered, but it would not be a serious question. This motivation might take some unusual form, but in a serious question it will be present in some way. For example, the question might be "Is my brother a murderer?" In emotionally charged questions such as this, it might be quite natural to feel that one doesn't want to find the answer, but that one should (for some reason) after all try to learn the answer. However, surely it is fair to say that the questioner in such emotional cases is motivated, in some way, to seek an answer; otherwise, one is at a loss to understand why and how the question could be seriously asked.

e. Q supposes that it is possible that R knows which of the two possible answers (A and B) is correct. Without the presumption that R could conceivably have the knowledge Q seeks, there would be no reason to ask R.

Q5. Q uses standard grammar and accepted usage for his utterance.

Now I shall perform a similar examination of the same example from the standpoint of the person (R) who responds

12 A questioning act which lacks this feature bears close resemblance to what Peirce called "paper" doubts, or at least these paper doubts seem to lack a feature of this kind, although just the absence of this feature may not be the only thing that distinguishes them from genuine doubt. See CP 5.514, 5.416, 5.376, 5.373-373.
to the question, the one to whom the question was directed. The overall assumptions of my analysis still apply. And just as Q1-5 are conditions which must hold from Q’s standpoint if his question is to succeed as a central and normal case of questioning, the following conditions are required if the respondent is to take the question as normal.

R1. By means of contextual indicators from Q (and perhaps because of the situation), R comes to understand two things:

a. He sees that a standard questioning context is present and that he is expected to respond with an answer in order to inform Q.

b. And just as Q indicates by his manner and speech that he is a questioner in search of information, R will indicate his willingness to respond to the question by giving the information if he has it.

R2. R understands that Q is holding the kind of suppositions about the subject which are outlined in Q2. R understands that Q is supposing that it is possible that R knows X.

R3. R understands that Q is holding the kind of suppositions about the predicate which are given in Q3. R also understands that Q is supposing that it is possible that R knows about Y.

R4. R understands that Q is holding the kind of suppositions and motives that are outlined in Q4.
Furthermore, R is willing to provide the information Q is seeking (in the form of what R believes to be the correct answer) if R is able to do so (if R does in fact have some kind of belief about the matter).

R5. R listens to Q in terms of standard grammar and correct usage for Q's utterance.

Some further annotations of the basic model are required. First, the model is based upon a conversational (face-to-face) setting. Some appropriate changes would have to be made if one were considering a written correspondence, or a dialogue with one's self, or if one were considering such nonconversational contexts as writing a book, or telling a bedtime story. It is possible that the differences in these various contexts might be philosophically significant, just as a question having a form different from the one considered might require a different characterization. But for now I am content to discuss just this kind of question within a conversational context.

Second, just as I have discussed only one form a question can take, I do not claim to have included all the aspects necessary for a full treatment of that form. And even the points I have raised would require more detailed consideration if this were an essay on questioning. However, since this is a discussion of Collingwood's concept of presupposing, I have tried to gauge the scope and completeness of the model to fit that kind of project.
Third, a very essential part of the overall scheme is that both Q and R themselves presume that normal conditions of communication hold for this particular communicative act. This in turn is possible only if they know how to communicate in this particular way (standard questioning) and only if each presumes that the other has this know-how. In laying out this model I have made this assumption about myself, that I have this know-how; then I have tried to describe my know-how in what amounts to a fairly complex hypothesis. The obvious possibility that I might have given a poor description of my ability is distinct from the fact that I do have the ability to communicate. That is, I am not trying to argue (fallaciously) that because I know (equals "has the ability to communicate in") the language, I know (equals "can give an accurate and complete philosophical description of") what it is to communicate in that language. My hypothesis must be regarded on its merits (which would involve how well it might explain the matter at hand as compared with competing hypotheses), not because someone might (mistakenly) regard such accounts as correct because of a linguistic form of the doctrine of self-evident truths.  

13Contrary to a significant part of contemporary philosophy, I agree with Peirce that it is an important part of the philosopher's business to propound explanatory hypotheses about his subject matter, hypotheses which are then tested in the appropriate sense. For examples of Peirce's discussion of philosophy as a "Science of
Fourth, I have adopted the convention of speaking in terms of supposing and suppositions because that locution falls easily to the tongue when the subject is presupposing or presupposition. 'Supposition' is a rather neutral term, operating in this case something like a placeholder or a blank which is to be filled with an appropriate mental attitude. To be more precise, instances in which I have said "Q (or R) supposes . . ." are instances in which that which fills the blank is a belief on the part of Q (or R). In other words, instead of saying "Q supposes . . ." it would be more precise to say that "Q believes . . ." where this belief stands in the relation of presupposing to the overall communicative act. These suppositions are beliefs, for in questioning of this kind, belief is the normal mental attitude found in each of the appropriate suppositions. 14

Discovery," see CP 1.180-202; 1.246-255; 1.126-134; 5.413; MS 280, pp. 1-6. For an example of the way in which philosophical hypotheses can be tested, see "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man," CP 5.213-263. For an example of a position which is radically skeptical both of the possibility of a science of philosophy and of the assertion that there are testable explanatory theses in philosophy, see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York, 1958), paragraphs 109-133.

Concerning doubt, Peirce held a similar position, namely that doubts do not occur in a vacuurn, there being reasons for doubt plus other cognitions or beliefs assumed in any given doubt. See CP 5.369; 5.265; 5.416; 5.512. Wittgenstein came to hold a similar view late in his life. See his On Certainty (Oxford, 1969), paragraphs 122, 130, 160, 247, 341-43, 354. Much of what Wittgenstein has to
3. Interpreting Collingwoodian Presupposition

Since the foregoing model is presented as an extension of Collingwood's research, it is proper to point out now that this extension can account for some of the missing details in his notion of presupposing. First, I shall consider the "kind of analysis" by means of which, Collingwood claims, one can come to say that thus-and-so is the immediate presupposition of a question.

According to my model, there are several suppositional components in normal questioning of this kind. The suppositions Collingwood noted under the rubric "presuppositions of a question" are limited to the kinds listed under Q2a and Q3a (and possibly aspects of Q4) in my presentation; there are other kinds of suppositional components which he did not take into account. We might label those he clearly noted (Q2a and Q3a) the C-suppositions (C for Collingwood) of a question. That the C-suppositions in my model amount to the same thing as Collingwood's notion of a question's immediate presupposition can be seen by working through the

say in this book parallels Peirce's account of doubt and belief. There is evidence that Wittgenstein was in some sense aware of this similarity, for he states (paragraph 422): "So I am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism. Here I am being thwarted by a kind of Weltanschauung." Perhaps his doubts that his remarks in On Certainty amount to pragmatism can be explained in terms of the hypothesis that he might have had in mind the pragmatism of James and not the pragmaticism of Peirce.
example I gave above: the immediate presupposition of "Does this mark mean 'man'?" is "This mark means something." This question is somewhat ambiguous. I believe that it could be translated as either (I) "Is the meaning of this mark 'man'?" or (II) "Is this mark a mark meaning 'man'?"

If version I is the intended import of the original question, then given the principles of Q2-3, I can easily state the C-suppositions. In this case they include the suppositions that there exist this (demonstratively indicated) trace or impression, and that it (the mark) is a sign in some language. These two suppositions come to about the same thing as the immediate presupposition Collingwood would give ("This mark means something") for this question.

If version II is the intended sense for the given question, a complication arises because this version is ambiguous concerning whether the mark is understood as just a meaningless piece of erosion or as being an actual inscription. My model provides a way to make explicit the C-suppositions of such a question while preserving this original ambiguity. On the assumption that version II is a normal question, by the use of Q2 one can derive the supposition that there exists this demonstratively indicated impression. The principles in Q4 yield this supposition: "'This mark is a mark meaning man' is intelligible when
seen as the correct response." That supposition makes sense only if one is willing to consider that this mark is conceivably a meaningful part of some inscription. This is the case because "mark meaning 'man'" could not be predicated intelligibly of that which is being considered definitely to be a meaningless piece of erosion or the like. If "mark meaning 'man'" is intelligibly predicable of this mark, then this mark must be taken as conceivably meaningful. Therefore, the C-suppositions for version II are "This mark exists" and "This mark is conceivably a meaningful mark." While these are slightly different from the Collingwoodian immediate presupposition originally given, I believe that they are more accurate and appropriate for this version of the original question.

I have worked through this example to show that my model can more accurately handle the kinds of tasks Collingwood originally intended for his technique. What I have called the C-suppositions in my model are the aspects of my revision of his approach which most clearly resemble his original procedure. The model is an improvement in several ways because it takes notice of C-suppositions as well as other kinds of appropriate suppositions, and it suggests procedures for developing all these suppositions.

These C-suppositions have another feature which is worth noting. They are content-based, one might say, while the other suppositions in the model are more
concerned with formal or procedural aspects. The exact nature of these C-suppositions changes from one question to another, but the procedural suppositions would apply to any question of this kind.

With these points in mind, it is possible to turn to the second difficulty in Collingwood's characterization of the phenomenon he calls presupposing: what is the nature of the relationship between a question and its presupposition? I shall adopt the term 'contextual supposition' as a means of referring to any of the suppositions noted in my model. In terms of my interpretation, Collingwood's presuppositions of a question are the same as the C-suppositions in my model, which are, in turn, contextual suppositions; thus, a presupposition in his sense is a contextual supposition. The task at hand can now be seen as a requirement to explain the relationship between a question and one of its contextual suppositions. The following argument schema summarizes my answer to that problem.

1. Q (a person) asks q (a question, e.g., "Is X a Y?").

2. If there are no reasons to think that this case (1) is not a normal, central case, it is presumed to be a normal case.

3. There are no reasons to think that this case is not a normal, central case. Therefore, this case is presumed to be a normal case.
of questioning of this kind (i.e., questioning in order to be informed).

4. All normal cases of questioning of this kind are cases in which the person asking the question supposes \( s \) (a contextual supposition).

5. Therefore it is reasonable to hold that \( Q \) supposes \( s \).

As it stands, this argument schema does not obviously show the relationship between a question and one of its contextual suppositions. It requires further commentary.

Premiss 1 is straightforward with one exception: I have limited the range of the variable \( q \) so that the only instances it can have are questions of the form considered in section 2. If one developed a comprehensive theory to include questions of any form, I suspect that one would find that no difficulty would arise in permitting this variable to range over any form a question might take.

Premiss 4 is correct if my model is correct. The model gives a series of contextual suppositions, each of which is a necessary condition of any normal case of questioning of this kind. In this premiss, \( s \) can be any one of those contextual suppositions. So, the fourth premiss simply re-states the model in general terms.
The second premiss is a new factor in my discussion. This premiss is intended as a description of what might be termed a social custom within our language community. That is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, in our society we presume that communicative acts of questioning of this kind are normal. This principle holds because the central case is just one in which there is no need that any additional factors or any other evidence be brought in before one can understand what is happening, while in the cases of questioning which are parasitic upon the central case (such things as questioning in order to "needle" someone) one has these other factors as a matter of necessity. As I have said, the second premiss is a description of an important principle we use in communicating; it is not a generalization stating that most people operate this way or that one operates this way most of the time. In its overall structure and use, this principle is similar to our legal principle of the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.

Premiss 3 is based upon one's knowledge of the immediate communicative situation. "Based upon" in this instance means that the third premiss is the conclusion of a piece of interpretive inference, the premisses of which are specific details of the communicative situation. Obviously, not just any detail of a situation will do as a premiss. For example, the color of the speaker's clothing
is usually irrelevant (but there are exceptions -- clowns or escaped convicts, for instance). Generally the kinds of situational details which are pertinent for this inference are the kinds of things mentioned in the questioning model. Since the model is limited, it may not include all the features or details one should (or could) give, but on the assumption that those which are given are correct, they are the kinds of things which are relevant to this inference. To restate that point in a slightly different way: what will count as premisses for this inference depends upon what one counts as normal for such questions, where 'normal' is being used in its natural language sense in which it is synonymous with "genuine" (and not synonymous with "usual"). In the sense I intend, when employed as a modifier, 'normal' is used to call attention to a standard against which we evaluate something. And in the kind

15 In referring to doubt and its role in initiating an inquiry, Peirce constantly reminds his readers that in order for an inquiry to arise, a real or genuine doubt must be present; otherwise (i.e., if the doubt is only a nominal doubt or a "paper" doubt) one will simply continue in the state of belief as before and no inquiry will begin. In Collingwoodian language, one would say that in order to seek an answer, one must have a real (normal) question, not merely a verbal one; otherwise (i.e., without a real question arising), one would have no need to seek an answer, so one would simply continue on without an increase in "mental effort" or without feeling any "mental hunger." Cf. Q4c above. The following citations are also representative of Peirce's view concerning real doubt: CP 5.370-387; 6.485; 6.469.
of questioning I have been discussing, what counts as genuine, as the norm against which such questioning acts are evaluated as standard, is given in the model. In this sense, to say that a question is normal is to say that it is a real question.

Someone might object that in my account I am confusing contextual implication with presupposing. I believe that such a complaint would be founded upon a misunderstanding of what I have been trying to accomplish. I have not approached Collingwood's work with the preconception that what he is talking about is the same thing as some accepted sense of the term 'presupposition'. I have been trying to find out what he means when he uses that term, as if he had simply used 'X' or 'Q-factor' (or any other mysterious title) instead of 'presupposition'. The above objection, however, violates this part of my procedure, for the objection can only make sense if one has already given some particular meaning to 'presupposition'. I think that I have discovered what Collingwood was talking about when he used the term in question. To avoid confusion, perhaps it would be appropriate to describe Collingwoodian presupposition as "contextual supposition," because it is not quite the same as what has been called contextual implication. Neither is it identical with something like Strawsonian presupposition. In Strawsonian presupposition to say that the statement S presupposes S' is to say that the truth of
S' is a necessary condition for the truth or falsity of S. A major dissimilarity here is that Collingwood is dealing with questions, and it would be difficult to see how a question could be understood as being either true or false. Professor Alan Donagan, a leading student of Collingwood's work, suggests another way of looking at Collingwoodian presupposition, a suggestion which I take to be misleading. He states that "... the logical relation in terms of which a presupposition is defined is, for Strawson, a relation between two statements, for Collingwood it is a relation between a statement and a question." Thus I take it that Donagan is proposing to interpret Collingwoodian presupposition as being some kind of logical relationship, after the fashion of material implication or entailment, which exists between a question and a statement. Aside from difficulties one might encounter in trying to use a question much as one would use a proposition to form a logically compound sentence with its main connective being something called a "presupposition connective," this proposal of Donagan's points our attention toward the possibility that questions are some kind of logical entity on a parallel with propositions. And this misinterprets

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Collingwood, for Collingwood is talking about questioning acts, not just questions. When Collingwood says that a question $p$ presupposes $p'$ (a supposition), what he means is that supposing $p'$ is one of the background conditions for the normal act of someone communicating $p$ (i.e., as a question). Furthermore, "supposing $p'" is not the same as "stating $p'," a condition which would be required given Donagan's interpretation. Collingwood's view has it that the relationship is based upon the nature of the communicative act of questioning in its normal instances; he does not see presupposing as some kind of logical connective that links "questions" and "statements."

This concludes my attempt to further explain the phenomenon Collingwood called "presupposition of a question." To summarize, it appears that "presupposition" as used by Collingwood is ambiguous, sometimes referring to the relationship between a question and that which it might presuppose, or sometimes referring to that which a question presupposes, namely its presupposition, which could be such things as a belief, a presumption, or a statement. This suggests that no linguistic entity is, in and of itself, a presupposition. It gains that status only insofar as it enters into the presupposing relation as the background condition of a communicative act. That is, the interesting thing about presupposition is its relational aspect, not the other aspect I have noted. With this in mind it
would be wise to be explicit about this ambiguity in using the term 'contextual supposition', which is my emendation for Collingwood's 'presupposition'. Therefore I shall limit that term, employing it only in the relational sense. To say that a communicative act contextually supposes S will serve as saying that S stands in that relation to this act, S being some appropriate linguistic entity such as a belief or a presumption. On the other hand, to use the substantive mode in saying that S is a contextual supposition of some communicative act is not a way of saying that S is some special kind of linguistic entity known as a "supposition" or a "contextual supposition"; rather it will be a way of saying that S stands in the relation of contextual supposing to that act, the term 'supposition' in this locution being a space holder for whatever the background condition might be (S in this case). For example, to say "Belief X is a contextual supposition of act Y" is not a way of saying that X is a supposition as opposed to being a belief. The fact that X enters into the relation of contextual supposing does not alter its status as a belief. Rather, it is a way of saying how belief X is related to act Y, 'supposition' being used as a place holder for X's place in the relation. One could coin a name for the place that Y holds in the relation, 'base' for instance. Thus to say that Y is the communicative base for X would not be a way of saying that Y is some special kind of
entity -- it remains as an act of questioning or whatever. This way of speaking is simply a means for noting the relation between Y and X.
CHAPTER III

PRINCIPIA

After the work of the preceding chapter, I am now in a position to provide an account of the nature of principia, the basic beliefs in a world view or belief system. Since I shall be comparing principia with Collingwood's absolute presuppositions, the discussion of presupposing was a necessary prerequisite for understanding that part of his view which is now before us. Because my purpose in discussing absolute presuppositions is to provide a "springboard" for presenting my proposals concerning principia, I shall not dwell on many details of Collingwood's approach which I would need to consider if my purpose were to present a closely written analysis and evaluation of his philosophy.

1. Relative and Absolute Presuppositions

Collingwood distinguishes between presuppositions which are relative and those which are absolute. He maintains that any particular presupposition, given the context within which it occurs, is correctly described with just one of these terms -- it could not be at once both relative and absolute in the same context.

In Collingwood's scheme a relative presupposition (abbreviated 'RP') is (EM, 29) "one which stands relatively to one question as its presupposition and relatively to
another question as its answer." Furthermore, only RP's can be verified.

To question a presupposition is to demand that it be 'verified'; that is, to demand that a question should be asked to which the affirmative answer would be that presupposition itself, now in the form of a proposition. To verify the proposition that my measuring tape is accurate [a presupposition of his use of the tape] is to ask a question admitting of the alternate answers 'the tape is accurate', 'the tape is not accurate'. Hence to speak of verifying a presupposition involves supposing that it is a relative presupposition.¹

Collingwood has more to say about absolute presuppositions (abbreviated 'AP') than he does about RP's. The following list summarizes the way he characterized this notion. I have appended convenient symbols in order to facilitate subsequent references to this summary. No doubt there will be many questions that occur to readers of the following list, questions concerning the correctness of what Collingwood is proposing. I do not now propose to try to either attack or defend these statements. My purpose is to get Collingwood's account of the nature of AP's before the reader in a succinct form. Subsequently I shall have several criticisms to offer, although surely I shall not mention all that might come to mind.

AP1. An AP is (EM, 31) "one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer."

¹EM, 30.
AP2. Among those persons who adopt a particular AP, that AP is not questioned (EM, 31).

AP3. People are apt to be ticklish in their absolute presuppositions (EM, 31). By this metaphor, Collingwood means that when one questions an AP that a person holds, that person is liable to become evasive or angry; in short, he will refuse, often in a testy manner, to accept the question, or if he accepts it in some sense, he may angrily refuse to answer it.

AP4. Since whatever is stated is in answer to a question, and a proposition is that which is stated, and since AP's are never answers to questions, it follows that AP's can not be propositions. This being the case, the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to them (EM, 32).

AP5. AP's are not capable of being verified; the idea of verification is not applicable to them (EM, 31).

AP6. An AP can not be undermined by "experience" since it is (in a given society) the yard-stick by which experience is judged (EM, 194).

AP7. The importance of AP's is due to their logical efficacy by means of which questions are enabled to arise. This efficacy in turn does not depend upon their being true or verifiable, but only in their being supposed (EM, 32). Of course, RP's have logical efficacy too, so this feature is not a generic one for AP's. What Collingwood
probably has in mind here is that for AP's this feature takes on new importance which it does not have in the case of RP's.

AP8. While an AP is not a proposition, a metaphysical statement -- a statement of the form that on such-and-such an occasion thus-and-so (an AP) was absolutely presupposed by someone -- is indeed a proposition which will be either true or false. Metaphysical statements are clearly a sub-class of historical propositions (EM, 55). Metaphysics for Collingwood is the historical science of AP's (EM, 47): "metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking."

AP9. An AP never occurs alone; rather AP's are always found in what Collingwood calls "constellations of AP's." Furthermore, AP's in such a constellation will be "consupponible," meaning that (EM, 66) "it must be logically possible for a person who supposes any one of them to suppose concurrently all the rest." The relationship of consupponibility is not one of implication, for if it were, the consequent of such an implication would not be an AP, since it would become relative to the antecedent of the implication (EM, 67). Thus, metaphysics as the historical science of AP's is not deductive in the fashion of Spinoza's Ethics.
AP10. Absolute presuppositions change from one era to another. The sense of change which Collingwood seems to have in mind here could be described as a change, within the thought of one person or a group of persons, from holding one presupposition as absolute to holding another (although perhaps related) presupposition as absolute, the former presupposition no longer being an AP in the thought of this person or group. The example he gives (EM, 49-51) deals with what he takes to be a transition, within the historical development of physics, from the AP "Some events have causes" to the AP "All events have causes" to the AP "No events have causes." The picture Collingwood is presenting here seems to be that the first AP in this series was replaced, as an AP (ceased to be an AP for physics), by the second in the series, and so on. Collingwood also holds that because people are not ordinarily aware of their AP's (hence they are not usually aware of any changes, in the above sense, that occur in them), changes in AP's are typically not a matter of choice (EM, 48n).²

²Given this part of Collingwood's view, it is difficult to see why he thought it was appropriate to use the adjective 'absolute' to describe this kind of presupposition. Other writers, noting (as Collingwood also does) that "absolute" presuppositions often lose their status as "absolutes" in the passage from one epoch to another, have preferred locutions such as "ultimate presupposition," as does, for example, E. A. Burtt, in his In Search of Philosophic Understanding (New York, 1965, p. 150). Collingwood could say that an AP is, relative to the system of thought in which it is found, absolute. But that way of talking is more trouble than it is worth.
APII. AP's undergo changes because a given constellation is always subject to what Collingwood calls "strains." He does little to explicate this notion, the following being the best account I have found in his work.

[The metaphysician] . . . will expect the various presuppositions he is studying to be consupponible only under pressure, the constellation being subject to certain strains and kept together by dint of a certain compromise or mutual toleration having behind it a motive like that which causes parties to unite in the face of an enemy. This is why the conception of metaphysics as a 'deductive' science is not only an error but a pernicious error, one with which a reformed metaphysics will have no truce. The ambition of 'deductive' metaphysics is to present a constellation of absolute presuppositions as a strainless structure like a body of propositions in mathematics. That is all right in mathematics because mathematical propositions are not historical propositions. But it is all wrong in metaphysics. A reformed metaphysics will conceive any given constellation of absolute presuppositions as having in its structure not the simplicity and calm that characterize the subject-matter of mathematics but the intricacy and restlessness that characterize the subject-matter, say, of legal or constitutional history.³

Collingwood has given a long example of the occurrence of an AP. It will be helpful to quote this in its entirety along with his analysis of such an event. This example is particularly felicitous because of its obvious relevance to the interview situation which confronts a student of world view studies who is trying to elicit comments on the basis of which he can characterize a native's world view.

³ EM, 76-77; cf. 48n.
Thus if you were talking to a pathologist about a certain disease and asked him 'What is the cause of the event E which you say sometimes happens in this disease?' he will reply 'The cause of E is C'; and if he were in a communicative mood he might go on to say 'That was established by So-and-so, in a piece of research that is now regarded as classical'. You might go on to ask: 'I suppose before So-and-so found out what the cause of E was, he was quite sure it had a cause?' The answer would be 'Quite sure, of course'. If you now say 'Why?' he will probably answer 'Because everything that happens has a cause'.

If you are importunate enough to ask 'But how do you know that everything that happens has a cause?' he will probably blow up right in your face, because you have put your finger on one of his absolute presuppositions, and people are apt to be ticklish in their absolute presuppositions. But if he keeps his temper and gives you a civil and candid answer, it will be to the following effect. 'That is a thing we take for granted in my job. We don't question it. We don't try to verify it. It isn't a thing anybody has discovered, like microbes or the circulation of the blood. It is a thing we just take for granted'. He is telling you that it is an absolute presupposition of the science he pursues.4

If the inquirer can find a person to experiment upon who is well trained in a certain kind of scientific work, intelligent and earnest in his devotion to it, and unaccustomed to metaphysics, let him probe into various presuppositions that his 'subject' has been taught to make in the course of his scientific education, and invite him to justify each or alternately to abandon it. If the 'inquirer' is skillful and the 'subject' the right kind of man, these invitations will be contemplated with equanimity, and even with interest, so long as relative presuppositions are concerned. But when an absolute presupposition is touched, the invitation will be rejected, even with a certain degree of violence.

The rejection is a symptom that the 'subject', cooperating with the work of analysis, has come to see that the presupposition he is being asked to justify or abandon is an absolute presupposition; and the violence with which it is expressed is a symptom that he feels the importance of this absolute presupposition for the kind of work to which he is devoted.5

4EM, 31. 5EM, 43-44.
2. 'Absolute Presupposition', an Inappropriate Term.

This list of attributes points out a problem for Collingwood. Nowhere does he explicitly say exactly what an AP is. He provides us with many qualities and symptoms of AP's, but he does not openly declare what they might be, aside from being AP's. And that is obviously not adequate if one accepts the interpretation of his term 'presupposition' which I developed above. On that account, to say that something is a presupposition is to claim that it stands in the relation of contextual supposing to some particular communicative act. But, in itself, this knowledge does not tell us anything about the nature of the contextually supposed thing; on the basis of just this much information any number of things could qualify to stand in such a relation -- beliefs, statements, propositions, dispositions, assumptions, choices, and so on. Saying that the contextually supposed thing is also absolute does not help either, for one wants to know what is absolute. The answer to this conundrum cannot be that the contextually presupposed thing is a presupposition, for we have seen that this term is only the substantive mode for expressing the relation of contextual supposing and is not descriptive of the thing which occupies the "blank" in that relation. Thus, it seems reasonable to assert that Collingwood's phrase "absolute presupposition" is an unhappy choice of words, not only because of difficulties with 'presupposition'
but because AP's are not truly absolute, in that they change (in the sense mentioned above). This result does not mean that there is no genuine phenomenon corresponding with Collingwood's phrase; it only means that an inappropriate set of words were chosen to describe the phenomenon.

We now require an identification of the basic nature of the phenomenon Collingwood characterizes with the term 'AP'. If one takes note of API, which is his fundamental description of AP's, I think it will be fairly easy to satisfy this requirement. According to that description, an AP always stands as a contextual supposition to the requisite kind of questioning. Furthermore, the particular kind of contextual supposition Collingwood had in mind would be one of those I have called C-suppositions. And, as I have indicated in discussion of the questioning model, in the normal case these are beliefs. So, since the kind of questioning mentioned in API is normal questioning like that in my model, it follows that AP's are basically beliefs of some kind. There is textual evidence that Collingwood would agree with this conclusion, for in discussing "God exists" as an AP (EM p. 188) he states: "... a person accustomed to metaphysical thinking, when confronted with the words 'God exists', will automatically put in the metaphysical rubric and read 'we believe (i.e., presuppose in all our thinking) that God exists'." I take it that here Collingwood is explicitly stating that the thing which
stands in the relation of contextual presupposing to many questions having to do with God (in these persons' minds) is a belief. Thus, we seem to be licensed to substitute "belief" for "presupposition." Perhaps the reason Collingwood preferred to describe certain kinds of beliefs as AP's lies in his intention to develop a relational account, that is, a description of the systemic aspect inherent in belief systems by means of which the system is ordered, one set of beliefs thereby being more "basic" than others. In describing this relational aspect, he seems to have taken for granted that the things being so related are beliefs.

Conclusions similar to those I have just mentioned concerning AP's will also be applicable to RP's, especially to the use of 'presupposition' in that locution. And just as I am making use of the term "principium" as a way of referring to my characterization of the basic beliefs which Collingwood described as AP's, I shall require another new term to substitute for his phrase "relative presupposition." Because of considerations which I shall make explicit as the discussion develops, I shall prefer the term "reasoned belief" as being more appropriate than RP.

I shall subsequently have numerous comments to offer concerning the status of principia within a belief system.

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6 See also EM, 193, 197. Additional rather explicit comments along these lines can be seen in Collingwood's Autobiography, 66-67.
but at the moment, it is necessary to say something about the nature of belief in general. A belief is basically a habitual way of acting, not the actions themselves; belief is a habit such that, given a particular kind of situation, one will act in a certain kind of way. Collingwood uses phrases suggestive of this doctrine in enough instances to lead one to suspect that he might have been willing to concur with it had it explicitly come to his attention. For example, in speaking of a change from one AP to another, he stated that "it is the most radical change a man can undergo, and entails the abandonment of all his most firmly established habits and standards for thought and action." However, there is little in Collingwood's work which can be of assistance in focusing more sharply this view of the nature of belief. For that, I must turn to Peirce who, following Bain (see CP 5.12), made an analysis of belief an important part of his philosophy. According to Peirce, the function of belief is to serve as a guide to our actions. Beliefs can fulfill this role because they are essentially in the form of a habit. And 'habit' has the following meaning.

Let us use the word "habit," throughout this book, not in its narrower, and more proper sense, in

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7 EM, 48n. Cf. EM 96, 133, 134, 192, 194, 196. Compare this with Peirce's account (for example, CP 5.358f.) of the difficulties inherent in the passage from belief to doubt to belief.
which it is opposed to a natural disposition (for the term acquired habit will perfectly express that narrower sense), but in its wider and perhaps still more usual sense, in which it denotes such a specialization, original or acquired, of the nature of a man . . . that he . . . will behave, or always tend to behave, in a way describable in general terms upon every occasion (or upon a considerable proportion of the occasions) that may present itself of a generally describable character.\textsuperscript{[8]}

Peirce rejects the notion that it is the single deeds that constitute the belief-habit. It is instead a general way of acting, often expressed in conditional propositions, which comprise the belief. Nor does belief, in many instances, make us act at once; it puts us into such a condition that we will behave in a particular way should the occasion arise. Belief is a satisfactory state, one which we do not avoid or change into another belief unless we are faced with a shock or surprise brought about by certain kinds of new experiences, experiences which interfere with the smooth operation of the habitual way of acting such that the habit is no longer followed, and action is suspended in a state of hesitancy, or would be so suspended in an appropriate situation.\textsuperscript{[9]}

Concerning this characterization of belief, a friend of mine, who is a very accomplished folklorist, proposed the following objection. "The statement that belief is

\textsuperscript{[8]}CP 5.538.

\textsuperscript{[9]}See CP 5.370f., 5.417, 5.480, 5.510.
basically a habitual way of acting blurs an important distinc-
tion between thinking and acting, for one can hold a
belief which does not result in action. For example, some-
one might believe that a dog's howl is a sign (in the sense
of "omen") of impending death in one's family. Now believ-
ing that is surely not a way of acting in the normal sense
of the word acting, for belief is a state of mind, and
states of mind are not actions." This is a felicitous com-
plaint, for it offers an opportunity to clear up some com-
mon misunderstandings about this way of conceiving the
nature of belief.

First, by "way of acting" I do not mean something like
the use of "way" in "See that action he is taking; isn't
he performing it in an admirable way?" This sense of the
word refers to a particular quality in a person's actions
as they occur in the present. The meaning I attached to
the word when I used it in describing belief is something
like its meaning in "My way is to keep my feet widely
spread when trying to hit the ball to left field." Here
the speaker is talking about one way as opposed to another,
and the kind of action of which he speaks is not now occur-
ring. Note also that the general form of this comment is
conditional -- given situation A, action B will be taken
(as opposed to action C or D, and so on). Thus, a belief
is more than just actions, or regularity in actions; how-
ever, given a certain belief, there will be a regularity
or pattern in my actions in appropriate situations. This factor is important in the study of world views, for an observed regularity in action is good grounds for the hypothesis that the person or persons involved in the action have a particular belief. But, the belief cannot be reduced to an action or a set of actions, just as a rule cannot be reduced to the set of instances in which it is obeyed. In Peirce's terms, a belief (since it is a habit) is an example of an irreducible "Third." ¹⁰

Is it true, then, as my friend suggested, that one can hold a belief that does not result in action? In one sense, this is a correct statement, because having a belief does not imply that one is now acting. As in the case of the example given above, one can believe that a dog's howl is an omen of death while taking no action related to such an omen. However, there is one sense in which it is true that having a belief must result in action. Suppose that someone hears a dog's howl under the appropriate circumstances, and then behaves as if there is no impending death in his

¹⁰First, Second, and Third are the terms Peirce uses to designate his "categories." These categories are very wide-ranging in Peirce's philosophy; furthermore, they take on different aspects depending upon which philosophical issue is under discussion. It would be virtually impossible to provide any kind of short summary of this doctrine that would be fair to Peirce's intentions. Therefore, I ask the interested reader to consult the following article which provides a good introduction to this aspect of Peirce's thought: Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Categories, and Language," Philosophical Review, 70(1961), 197-223.
family (or in the appropriate group). Then we would rightly think that he does not in reality have this belief about the significance of a dog's howl. In other words, having a belief means that, given a particular type of circumstance, one has a habitual way of acting. So, if a person declares that he has a certain belief, yet does not act in the appropriate way in the kind of situation relevant to his belief, he does not have that belief. Paraphrasing Collingwood, we could say that this would be a "merely verbal" belief, or in Peircean terms, we would say that it is a "paper" belief; that is, this person has only uttered the words, "I believe x." He does not have the requisite kind of habit. Hence, he does not have the belief in question.

3. Principia and Justification

It will be convenient now to consider Collingwood's observation that an AP is not questioned among people who adopt it (AP2). I want to do that by examining the kind of situation Collingwood depicts in the pathologist example cited above. I choose to work in terms of this example partly because it is representative of the kind of issues one would confront in developing a culture's world view by means of conducting interviews, one difference being that the student of world view will be conversing with
non-scientists. For the sake of brevity, I shall shorten 'questioner' and 'respondent' to 'Q' and 'R' respectively.

On the basis of Collingwood's example, it is clear that the context of questioning relevant to the characterization of principia (AP's, roughly) is that of questioning a principium's justification, for in this example Q continually asks R to inform Q of the justification R has for some belief R holds. This procedure reaches a point at

11 The native informant is not a scientist in the sense of that term that is associated with institutionalized science in modern society; however, the native is a scientist in the broad sense in which Collingwood uses the word in that the native has a systematic and orderly way of thinking.

12 In addition to the light these comments might throw upon the nature of a principium, they are important for another reason, for they confirm something which has been implicit in my discussion of Collingwood on questioning (the questioning model) as annotated by Peirce's views on doubting. It now seems clear that what Collingwood meant by "questioning" was normal questioning directed toward finding out a belief's justification, and this sense of "question" is that which is often used as a surrogate for "doubt." One could say that the communicative activity of serious questioning in search of information about a belief's justification is one speech counterpart of honest doubt in search of a stable belief, doubt being often discussed in personal or psychological terms and questioning being often discussed in linguistic or communicational contexts. Collingwood emphasizes questioning and speech, whereas Peirce often focuses on the personal aspect in terms of doubt and belief. Epistemically, there seems to be no important difference between these two schemata; the two accounts appear to be functionally identical. This suggests that Collingwood's logic of Question and Answer and Peirce's account of the process of the Fixation of Belief (what he generally refers to as Inquiry, see CP 5.374) are somewhat equivalent descriptions of the same process. Peirce prefers the general designation, Inquiry, while Collingwood, emphasizing what Peirce would call the scientific kind of
which R responds with a belief which is a justification for previous responses in which R believes, but which inquiry (as opposed to non-scientific kinds of inquiry), calls it Scientific Thinking. Both these terms were intended to stand for something other than the meanings usually associated with "science," as found in such locutions as "physical science" or "empirical science." I think that the process that they were meant to describe is something like "mental life as ordered, ongoing thinking which is directed toward truth," or at least, one's best attempt at that kind of thinking. It would be pertinent to add here that Peirce's doubt-belief model could also be seen as a communicational model, since it seems to be ultimately based upon his "theory of signs" which is a general logic of communication. No one has shown this, nor do I intend to do it now, but I feel certain that this is the matrix for Peirce's theory of inquiry. I have mentioned Collingwood's account of "scientific thinking" in earlier remarks. For Peirce's theory of inquiry, consult "The Fixation of Belief," CP 5.358f. For some comments by Peirce on questioning, see CP 5.394, 6.191, 5.584, 5.370f.

I will not attempt to defend this comparative thesis in detail here. Instead, in addition to the suggestive comments I have made above, I shall only add that I am not alone in advancing it. Professor Louis O. Mink in Mind, History, and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood (Bloomington, Ind., 1969) states (p. 7):

... The themes most explicit in Collingwood's later work but discoverable throughout the whole career of his thought are those commonly associated with pragmatism and existentialism. In a very general way, this may account for the fact that philosophers have found in Collingwood a provocativeness not easy to dismiss as merely a matter of style or manner, while nonphilosophers have endured his philosophical arguments in the feeling that they carry significance beyond the intramural disputes of professional philosophers.

Mink continues by noting in some detail certain affinities between Collingwood and the pragmatists, primarily Dewey (see pp. 7-9). Of specific interest to the issue at hand is the fact that Mink agrees that Collingwood's logic of question and answer is best understood as a theory of inquiry in the pragmatist mold. One additional bit of textual information from both Collingwood and Peirce seems to provide further evidence for this thesis. In his Autobiography, Collingwood exposes his brand of pragmatism very nicely.
itself has no further justification, or at least R (nor any other member of his society, Collingwood suggests) is unable to inform Q of any further justification for it. The requests for justification take this form: "Is what you say (believe) justified?" In the final request for justification, "what you say (believe)" refers (in this particular case) to "Every event has a cause." This belief is identified as a principium because R does not question its justification, or he simply refuses to question its justification, perhaps becoming angry when asked to justify it. The fact that in regard to justification, R "calls a halt" at this point is one fact which leads Q to entertain the hypothesis that this belief is a principium in R's thought. This kind of example is important for understanding principia and for developing a workable interview technique for world view studies. Hence, it deserves detailed attention.

Taking "Every event has a cause" to be represented by 'E', the question at which R balks is written as "Is E justified?" The following account is an abstract of certain

(pp. 26f.) in that he admits that he is of the "laboratory" frame of mind when it comes to knowledge. This phrase is one of Peirce's favorite locutions for describing his own view in contrast to what he called "seminary" philosophy: see CP 1.126-129; 5.411; 6.3. CP 1.128 suggests also that Peirce's view of the nature of metaphysics parallels that advanced by Collingwood.
aspects of this situation in terms of appropriate parts of
the questioning model. In seriously asking this question, 
Q believes that the possible answers are (A) E is justified 
and (B) E is not justified (Q4a). Q believes that just one 
of these two possible answers is in actuality correct 
(Q4b), and Q believes that each of these options is in some 
sense possible and intelligible as a correct answer (Q4c). 
Furthermore, Q does not know which of these two options is 
correct, and Q is motivated to learn which option is ac-
tually correct (Q4d). Meanwhile, upon hearing this ques-
tion, R understands that Q is holding the kinds of beliefs 
I have outlined above (R4). However, R does not understand 
that option B is even possibly correct, so in the absence 
of this component (that part of the R side which corre-
sponds to Q4c), R rejects this question as being abnormal. 
We must remember that R believed that what he was about to 
hear from Q would be a normal question. He believed this 
because questions preceding this one were normal and the 
questioning context for this one suggested that what Q was 
about to say would be normal. But, in effect, R comes to 
reject this contextual supposition and says instead that 
this is not a normal question, not a question that would 
be asked in his society. That is the impact of R in Col-
lingwood's example saying, "We don't question it."

The important issue now becomes the reason (or reasons) 
why R, from his side of the communication, rejects Q4c for
this particular question. In approaching an answer to this matter, I shall first focus upon a more complete characterization of that element in terms of this specific request from Q. What we have here is not simply normal questioning, but rather normal questioning of justifications. Prior to the question at which R "balks," the questions had been directed toward eliciting beliefs from R, beliefs expressed in the form "P is the justification of Q." In the final question, R has no belief which could serve in the slot for P in the foregoing format. Although he might believe E is justified, R cannot provide Q with a statement of a belief which justifies E because he does not know of such a belief. If he admits R's question as normal, he will be forced to think that E is possibly not justified. Prior to this, in the earlier questions, R had been willing to comprehend Q's entertaining the possibility that R's beliefs were not justified because he knew that they were justified and he could give reasons for them; it was harmless for him to empathize with the requirement placed upon Q that both alternatives be possibly correct. Although R knew which alternative was correct, he was not himself required to conceive that both alternatives were possibly correct; R was only required to understand that Q was holding both options as "live." But in the case of the final question concerning the justification of E, R is placed in a different position. Q's question is no longer
one step removed, as it were, removed by empathy. This question becomes R's question as well as Q's question. That is, because R does not know an answer to give in this case, he, in effect, becomes a second Q, or he assumes the role of Q, in that now he is actually required to honestly entertain the two options as "live" options, as both being possibly correct.

What is this condition into which R has been thrust? I believe that, in order to be absolutely accurate in describing this situation, talking in terms of questioning is no longer completely correct. What R is faced with in assuming the role of Q, in this specific instance, is a request or suggestion that he really be in doubt about E. This is the case because doubt is a normal question in which the issue is that of the justification of the belief in question. When, concerning a particular belief, one honestly opens up the two options (A and B) as being "live" or possibly correct, with the predicate of both options being "... justified?" (i.e., when the normal question has this minimum content: "Is ____ justified."), that is doubt. Since normal questioning of the justification of a belief is doubt, that means that R is being thrust into the role of doubter of one of his beliefs, namely E. But R does not doubt E. So it is understandable that he rejects the question, for in doing so, he rejects placing himself in the role of doubter of one of
his beliefs. He would only come to doubt one of his beliefs for some reason, not because someone is presumably urging him to take the role of a doubter. A principium is a belief, which implies that in order to successfully doubt it, the person in question must genuinely doubt it, which means doubting it for some putatively sound reason, and not because of being asked to doubt it.

4. Pragmatic Justification

To continue with Collingwood’s example, given that R does not doubt E, but can give no other belief justifying his belief in E, does that mean that E is not justified? I think not. R obviously will think that it is somehow appropriate for him to believe E. This puts him into something of a dilemma, given the context of his interchange with Q. For while he believes that E is correct, he may not be able to think of any reason for believing that, and so far he has defended his beliefs by giving Q a reason for them. And here, he can give no reason. On the other hand he does believe E and does not want to abandon it, and probably would not abandon it even if he could not think of a reason for it, for he senses that it is valuable and vital in his life and in the life of his associates. Exasperation and embarrassment at these two undesirable alternatives might partially explain why persons in such situations often "blow up" or become "ticklish," as
Collingwood noted. Of course, this emotional reaction does not serve as a help in developing the logic of this situation; however, it does serve as a useful symptom when dealing with actual situations of the kind depicted by this example.

In any case, I think it is not necessary that R need lose his head at this juncture. He could be operating on the assumption that E could only be justified in the same way that one might justify claims such as "Alcohol is an antiseptic," that is, by reference to other beliefs through tests or verifications. If R were a bit more relaxed, he could argue that while E cannot be justified in that way, it can be justified in some sense by pointing out that E makes possible and intelligible a particular cognitive way of life. Another reason an over-emotional respondent might "blow up" then, is that he recognizes to some extent that if E is thrown out, a sizeable portion of his way of life as it is now practiced must be thrown out too. And since R sees no other way to practice his life, no alternative which he thinks might in some sense be better than living in terms of E, he quite rightly clings to E. It is only natural that a good deal of emotion is associated with this kind of event, for seriously contemplating the absence of one's present way of life (without having in mind a possible substitute) can be very disturbing.
I might propose another example here in order to make this point in terms of a situation that is more familiar. In discussions in which a person's religion is called into question, the conversation often ends with a sentence like, "I just believe in God," with a heavy emotional stress on the word I have underlined. What a declaration like this might mean is that this belief in God is not just a belief in the minimum sense, but a special belief which justifies other beliefs, yet is not itself justified by any other belief. Hence, we witness the above mentioned emotional declaration of a principium in response to questions about the justification of one's religion. This person is telling us that the life he lives is this belief, in an important sense, for this basic belief is reflected in a great many of his actions. Indeed, in Peirce's way of looking at belief, the fact that this person behaves in the way that he does is what enables one to infer that "he believes in God." His whole life is ordered such that he never knowingly contradicts this belief as long as it remains his belief. And of course, there is a big connection between Peirce's analysis of belief and contemporary existentialists such as Sartre, for Peirce would acknowledge that a person who merely verbalizes a "belief" while declining to act in a way appropriate to that belief (given appropriate circumstances) is a self-deceived person.  

For representative statements on self-deception
I think that it is reasonable to describe this sort of appeal to one's way of life as being a justification of some kind; furthermore, it strikes me that it is in some way a pragmatic form of justification since it is an appeal to practice, albeit in a way which is slightly different from certain kinds of pragmatic justification philosophers often discuss (e.g., matters such as simplicity, convenience, or fruitfulness, these usually being mentioned within the context of comparing competing hypotheses). In what follows, therefore, when I speak of pragmatic justification for principia, I shall mean the special sense I have outlined above. 14

Collingwood, however, insists (EM, 44) that "absolute presuppositions do not need justification," but by this he seems to mean that they do not need justifying in the same way that RP's need justifying. Thus, we could say that principia are not justified by another belief, whereas reasoned beliefs (what Collingwood calls RP's) are those

from Peirce, see CP 5.265, 5.416. For a careful account of the nature of self-deception, see Herbert Fingarette, Self-Deception (New York, 1969).

beliefs which, within a given belief system, can be justified by reference to other beliefs. This kind of arrangement leaves one free to hold that principia are justifiable in the pragmatic sense, but not in the "reasoned" sense in the manner appropriate to reasoned beliefs. Thus, principia are "unreasoned" beliefs, in that since they are the basis for giving reasons in a particular belief system, it is not possible to cite other beliefs which are reasons for believing the principia. 

Pragmatic justification also permits one to make sense of "logical efficacy," another of Collingwood's partially explained metaphors. In speaking of AP's, he states (EM, 32): "... their use in science is their logical efficacy." I presume this means that principia would be "efficient" in that they make possible a fairly large realm of inquiry or a rather broad way of life. This is the kind of pragmatic justification I have mentioned. At another place, Collingwood claims (EM, 173): "... it is proof that depends on them [AP's], and not they on proof." That such principia serve thus (that their logical efficacy is

\[15\] Wittgenstein appears to be working along similar lines in the recently published On Certainty (Oxford, 1969). What Wittgenstein calls "beliefs which stand fast" seem to be similar to what I call principia: see, for example, paragraphs 87, 116-117, 144, 151-152, 167. For comments which take note that "beliefs which stand fast" are not verified or tested, see paragraphs 110, 164, 166, 192.
to make proof possible strikes me as being a forceful kind of justification.

This kind of approach would give the pathologist a strong way of replying to his questioner. One can imagine him uttering the following comments.

How else are we to operate as pathologists? Do you have any better ideas? We train our students and young practitioners in this principle. It has, in a large part, enabled us to do the kinds of things we can now do in terms of diagnosing disease and in terms of our continuing research directed toward obtaining a wider understanding of disease. This research, in turn, continues to give us increasing control so that we can prevent or cure disease. We are quite pleased with the kinds of results we have obtained using this principle. If we gave up this principle, we would in effect be giving up the practice of pathology; and we know that to give up the practice of pathology would eventually be harmful to humanity. Thus, we do not see "E is not justified" as being a correct response to your question. E is justified. The possibility and worth of the practice of our way of life as it is now known justifies it, and that is an adequate justification. No inadequacy is suggested here simply because this principle is not supported by that other kind of justification which is often
called verification. That is as it should be, for one cannot verify all of one's beliefs.

There is evidence that Collingwood was aware of the kind of feature I refer to as pragmatic justification. For example, consider the following statement about AP's in terms of their being principles for a science (or system of orderly thinking).

The principle that natural science is essentially an applied mathematics is thus by no means an indispensable presupposition for any science of nature. A presupposition it certainly is, and an absolute presupposition. It could not possibly be learnt from experience or justified by research.\(^{16}\)

Collingwood saw that there might be good reason for saying that AP's, while not justified in the same manner as RP's (i.e., "by research"), are justified, at least in some sense. He also described the kind of justification appropriate to AP's as being pragmatic; it closely resembles the kind of pragmatic justification I have presented.

The only sense in which it [an AP] can be justified by research is the pragmatic sense. You can say, and rightly, "See what noble results have come from its being accepted for the last three hundred years! One must surely admit that it works; and that is sufficient justification." Perhaps. It depends upon what you want. If all you want is to congratulate yourself on having the kind of science that you have, you may do so. If you want to congratulate yourself on having the best of all possible kinds of science, that is not so easy; for nobody knows what all the possible kinds would look like.\(^ {17}\)

\(^{16}\) EM, 254; cf. p. 255, pp. 263-264.

\(^{17}\) EM, 254; cf. pp. 263-264.
While I can agree with Collingwood's comment that we do not know what all possible kinds of science would look like, pragmatic justification is not simply a matter of congratulating oneself upon having a science that works. That might be part of what is involved. But this kind of justification goes further and includes what Collingwood has himself praised under the rubric of "logical efficacy," that feature of principia by means of which they make an inquiry possible or intelligible, or enable it to "arise."

Furthermore, while one might not congratulate himself for having a particular science, one could do something similar to that by being aware of the value of one's science in terms of one's way of life. As I have suggested above, this awareness of the value of a science and its corresponding principia is heightened by contemplating what life would be without it. This is not a form of congratulation, but something rather like appreciation of the value of a life-way, an appreciation that occurs (in imagination) in the context of being aware (at least to some extent) of the emotional and practical difficulties involved in having no principia, or no science, or no way of life.18

18 Peirce holds a view similar to that of Collingwood concerning the role of principles in science. See CP 1.129.
5. Review

After presenting the overall program of this essay, at the beginning of chapter two I became involved in dealing with several details concerning Collingwood's metaphysics and the nature of principia. This has led me away from the original context established in chapter one, a context in which the term 'world view' was mentioned quite often. Of course, I have been discussing matters pertaining to world views, but my comments have been directed toward more detailed topics, albeit those related to my overall goal. It will be appropriate to pause here to summarize the foregoing discussion in terms of its relationship to my general thesis which is that world views are belief systems. Since many of my comments have arisen within the context of Collingwood's characterization of AP's, it will be appropriate to present this review in a way which takes account of that factor.

I was initially led to consider Collingwood's theory of the nature of metaphysics because I thought that there was a considerable resemblance between what he was sketching and what I found in a germinal form in the writings of folklorists and anthropologists who are students of world view studies. I suspected that Collingwood's AP's were basically beliefs. I defended this conjecture in chapter two through my consideration of his meaning for 'presupposing', 'presupposition', and 'question'. The findings on
these topics were employed in chapter three so that a better understanding of Collingwoodian AP's could be achieved. Through a consideration of Collingwood's theory of absolute presuppositions in light of the results of chapter two, I have developed an account of what I call principia which are the "basic beliefs" or "building blocks" of a worldview or belief system. Several properties of principia have been developed to this point, and in the spirit of this review, I want to recapitulate those in terms of Collingwood's original comments about AP's (which I condensed into AP1-11).

In terms of the amendments I have proposed, AP1 can be rewritten as: "A principium is a belief which always stands (within a specific belief system), relatively to all normal questions concerning verificational justification with which it is meaningfully connected, as a reason in a verificational justification; it never stands as a belief which is verifiably justified by another belief within its belief system." One could add that a belief's status as a principium is not intrinsic to that particular belief, but is instead a function of its place within a system of believing and justifying. This comes close to being a kind of "grammatical" property of principia, for we see that a principium is distinguishable in that it can never serve, with respect to a normal question concerning justification, as that which is verificationally
justified by another belief in the same system. Or, one could say, a principium always stands as a reason in a verificational test, never as a result of such a test or request for justification (a question). On the other hand, a reasoned belief (Collingwood's RP) has the property that it can both serve as a reason in some verificational events and as a result in others.

Given that way of rewriting AP1, it becomes clear why AP2 is roughly correct, for given the nature of a principium, it follows that within its system, it is not questioned. That is, a principium is not itself open to verificational justification (although it is justified in the pragmatic sense I have outlined), so questions involving its verificational justification in terms of some other belief will not be present in that system. Similar comments would apply to AP5 and AP6 because a belief system is constituted by its principia to a large extent since they are the basis of verification in that system and are thus, because of this status, not themselves verified. Here I am interpreting "experience" (in AP6) to mean something like verification. I have already commented upon AP3 at an earlier point in this chapter, so I will not repeat those remarks again.

This brings me to AP4. There seems to be some difficulty with the argument mentioned there. It will be helpful for this review to try to clear that up. The argument
appears to equivocate on 'proposition', for in one premiss the sense utilized is that of "whatever is stated" while in the conclusion, the sense seems to be "that which has a truth value." What is needed here is some kind of assumption which would connect 'proposition' in the sense of "that which is stated" with the notion of truth value; I believe that there is, in Collingwood's writing, just such a presumption to be found. It is clear that Collingwood regards truth (true propositions) as the result of an inquiry, or of questioning, or of episodes of verificational justification (these three are roughly the same thing). Consider the following remarks which support that contention.

To inquire into the truth of a presupposition is to assume that it is not an absolute presupposition but a relative presupposition. Such a phrase as 'inquiry into the truth of an absolute presupposition' is nonsense.19

In Chapter XIV I have in effect defined the positivistic mistake about metaphysics as the mistake of thinking that metaphysics is the attempt to justify by appeal to observed facts the absolute presuppositions of our thought. This attempt is bound to fail because these things, being absolute presuppositions, cannot stand as the answers to questions, and therefore the question whether they are justifiable, which in effect is identical with the question whether they are true, is a question that cannot logically arise. To ask it is the hallmark of pseudo-metaphysics.20

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19EM, 54.

20EM, 162.
There will also be something which I call pseudo-metaphysics. This will be a kind of thought in which questions are asked about what are in fact absolute presuppositions, but arising from the erroneous belief that they are relative presuppositions, and therefore, in their capacity as propositions, susceptible of truth and falsehood. Pseudo-metaphysics will ask such questions as this . . .: Is AP true? Upon what evidence is AP accepted? How can we demonstrate AP? What right have we to presuppose it if we can't? 21

So, for Collingwood, something is labelled as true only if it is the result of a successful inquiry, and since AP's cannot be the result of an inquiry (because if they were, they would be verificationally justified by another belief, and hence no longer AP's), it follows that the distinction between truth and falsity (at least in Collingwood's sense for these two terms) does not apply to them. Thus we see that given the way in which Collingwood wants to characterize truth and falsehood, 22 this argument seems to make good sense.

These considerations do seem to clear up what Collingwood means when he says that an AP is neither true nor false. However, this way of treating principia as being neither true nor false seems to conflict with actual experience. Persons holding principia do say that they are

21 EM, 47.

22 Collingwood's way of treating truth and falsehood is, by the way, in substantial agreement with a Logical Positivist such as A. J. Ayer. The Positivist, because of the verification principle, when faced with an AP wants to characterize it as meaningless or as a pseudo-proposition. Collingwood agrees that it is neither true nor false, and that it is not a proposition, but wants to include it as a meaningful and useful phenomenon in its own right. See EM, 165.
true. That is, if I believe p, I will say when asked that p is true. And since principia are beliefs, people holding them do say that they are true.23

These difficulties can be met in the following way. One regards a proposition as true if one has confidence in that proposition such that one will act upon it in the appropriate circumstances. One can come to have confidence in a proposition in more than one way. One very common way is through an inquiry in which one obtains a verification which can be seen as a reason for the confidence. That is, one sees that confidence in the proposition is justified. This way of coming to have confidence was emphasized by the Logical Positivist school against which

23 Peirce maintained, as early as 1877, that for one to believe p suggests that one would also say that p is true. This principle is contained in the following comment (CP, 5.375): "... we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is a mere tautology to say so." Compare the following statement which is from CP 5.376. "It is a very common idea that a demonstration must rest on some ultimate and absolutely indubitable propositions. ... But, in point of fact, an inquiry, to have that completely satisfactory result called demonstration, has only to start with propositions perfectly free from all actual doubt. If the premisses are not in fact doubted at all, they cannot be more satisfactory than they are. ... We have to acknowledge that doubts about them may spring up later; but we can find no propositions which are not subject to this contingency." Of course, Peirce is using 'proposition' here to refer to both principia and reasoned beliefs, a usage not preferred by Collingwood. One finds similar comments about believing p and saying p is true in more recent discussions of belief. See, for example, Bernard Williams, "Deciding to Believe," in Language, Belief, and Metaphysics, ed. H. E. Kiefer and M. K. Munitz (Albany, 1970), p. 96.
Collingwood was reacting. The Positivists said in effect that one does not come to have confidence in a principium through inquiry, and they concluded from this that principia are nonsense. Collingwood agreed that one does not come to have confidence in principia or AP's through inquiry, but insisted that principia were valid phenomena in their own right and were not nonsense simply because they did not live up to the Positivists' criterion for meaningfulness. But in rejecting the Positivist critique of principia by admitting that they are not the sort of thing that can be true or false, Collingwood falls into the Positivist mistake of having a very narrow conception of truth—namely that we only say something is true if it is the result of inquiry or verificational justification.

The move needed here is to acknowledge that there are ways other than verification by which one comes to have confidence in a proposition. Some propositions, including principia, are propositions in which one simply has confidence. This confidence is not attained through verification or testing or through scientific inquiry. A person comes, for example, to have confidence in the proposition "God exists" through socialization or perhaps through a conversion (which is not a verificational experience, but more like making an ungrounded decision). Now to have confidence in a proposition is the same as believing what the proposition describes or states. So, any proposition
I believe will be a proposition in which I have confidence (this is probably part of what Peirce meant in his "tautology" remark). Therefore, it makes good sense for me to say, contrary to Collingwood's claims, that my principia are true, since principia are beliefs. My confidence in my principia does not come from inquiry, but nevertheless, I am confident in them, and I will say that they are true; and, it makes very good sense to do so.  

In terms of these remarks, it is possible to revise AP4 along the following lines. "Since whatever is justifiably (verificational sense) stated is the result of an inquiry, and since Collingwood calls 'proposition' that which is thusly justifiably stated, and since a principium is never the result of an inquiry within its own belief system, it follows that principia are not propositions (i.e., they are not verificationally justified and cannot be "stated" in Collingwood's sense). Because principia are not verified through inquiry, one does not come to say they are true (come to have confidence in them) through inquiry; however, principia are "true" in that they are

24 The suggestions I am making here appear to agree with one aspect of Wittgenstein's comments in On Certainty. I have in mind his insistence that there are certain ungrounded beliefs which one regards with conviction and confidence, but not because of an inquiry. Remarks on this topic are found throughout the book, but see especially section III (193 through 299). Peirce also presents a similar view: see for example, MS 846-857.
beliefs, and a person holding a belief has confidence in his belief and is willing to say that it is true." The result achieved here is that principia cannot be said to be knowledge if one means by knowledge something like "justified (verificationally) belief." One can, however, say that one's principia are "true" in that one has confidence in them. These considerations save a great deal that is correct in the remarks by Collingwood cited just above while emending a shortcoming in the way he deals with "truth."

These comments lead very nicely into the matter of AP7, since a principium is important for reasons other than those associated with verificational justification. As I have argued elsewhere in this chapter, the importance a principium has lies in its pragmatic justification, namely that it makes a way of life intelligible such that without it the way of life in question would no longer be possible in its present form. Using these notions, AP7 can be revised as follows. "The importance of principia is due to their pragmatic justification in that because of them certain kinds of inquiry (or, more generally, certain modes of life) are made possible or intelligible. This intelligibility or possibility does not depend upon a principium having been justified verificationally, but only in its being actually believed."
AP8 can also be more adequately rephrased without much difficulty. "Although a principium is not verificational justified (i.e., is not a "proposition" in Collingwood's sense), a sentence of the form that on such-and-such occasion thus-and-so was a belief that someone held as a principium is a sentence which can be verificationally justified." Such a sentence can be so justified because of the existence of the science of metaphysics which (as Collingwood rightly saw) has its own principia (since it is a science or system of orderly thought) by means of which the metaphysician is enabled to inquire into who held what principia at what time.25

Collingwood's claim, noted in AP8, that metaphysics is a "historical" science is very appropriate given the thesis I am defending, namely that worldview studies is a science of belief systems. As I have argued above, principia do not intrinsically have the status that they have -- they achieve their status because of their participation within a given system of belief which exists in a given place among specific persons. Thus, that a belief is a principium will be a fact that is tied to certain persons at a certain time and place. In other words, a principium is not "necessary" nor is it an "absolute truth for all time." A principium is a belief and is therefore contingent upon

25See EM, 63.
there being someone that believes it. 26

I am not yet sure that I fully comprehend what Collingwood was saying in regard to his theory of "constellations" and "consupponibility" as summarized in AP9. However, I will offer a few statements about this general subject using the concepts I have been developing. To say that a principium never occurs singly, but always in the presence of other principia, might be a way of stating a contingent fact about belief systems. Prima facie, it does have plausibility. However, from the standpoint of logic, I can think of no reason why there could not be a belief system with just one principium in it. Yet, I know of no world view, as found in some actual society, which does not have many principia in it. Concerning what Collingwood calls "consupponibility," that could be a way of referring to the fact that a given belief system is ultimately delineated by virtue of the contingent fact that it is the beliefs of a particular group. Thus, "consupponibility" becomes "believed by these people." This would be some kind of "relationship," loosely taken. To use Collingwood's lingo, it would be a kind of "historical" relationship in that the relation between one principium and another in the same "constellation" would be that these principia are believed by these persons at this time, perhaps because of something

26 Cf. Peirce's remarks along this line in CP 5.416.
in their history (not because of an inquiry, however). That suggests that the relation could be described as "joint belief" which would be parallel to, but not identical with, ordinary conjunction in logistic theory which means something like "joint assertion" or "jointly stated." Thus, Collingwood seems to be correct in his insistence that "joint belief" is not a relation involving implication in the way that traditional "deductive" metaphysics involves implication.

If this way of interpreting Collingwood's remarks about "constellations" is on the right track, then one would expect to find "strains" (as noted in AP11) if that terms means either conflicts between beliefs or conflicts among persons (in the given group) vis-a-vis their belief system. Within a given world view, which of necessity includes a social dimension, there will be slight disagreements among persons as to various beliefs. And in terms of the beliefs themselves, if one takes a list of the beliefs in a group's world view, one will surely find that there are inconsistencies in a logical sense, a phenomenon often known under the title of "compartmentalization." This inconsistency among beliefs in a world view is not completely accessible to a typical person in the given group because of the fact that many of the beliefs in his world view are not verbalized in a self-aware manner, but are instead present in the form of unverbalized habits of action. Thus,
it is possible for one to have beliefs that are logically in conflict and to fail to be fully aware of that fact. This feature of belief systems, the presence of "strains," is no doubt one of the reasons why it is natural that persons at times tend to become philosophical and reflective, for one can become aware of these "strains" then try to resolve them in a reflective manner. And, as I suggested above, it is possible for one person who shares a world view with another person to have a slightly different set of beliefs than the other has, different either in the sense of having an additional belief or in the sense of having rather similar beliefs such that one wants to say that they are slightly different interpretations of a single belief. Thus, "strains" are a combination of both logical and social factors.

Given these kinds of features, one can begin to understand why changes in belief systems are inevitable, although perhaps usually slow. These changes would occur for a variety of reasons, both logical and social, and would resemble (cf. AP11) the restlessness of something like legal or constitutional history. And, as Collingwood suggests (AP10), changes are often made in a world view without the persons involved being fully aware that a change has occurred. Saying that the changes sometimes are either retarded or facilitated because of "pressure" (AP11) is probably a way of referring to the social side of the coin.
To give a simplistic example, a powerful and charismatic leader can, through force of personality and prestige, hold a social grouping together in a *status quo*. When he dies, the group might begin a period of change, including some kind of change in world view. Understanding this kind of interaction between logical and social factors at this point in world view studies would require more than just philosophical analysis — various kinds of social scientific knowledge about persons and groups will also be required to complete the picture.²⁷

Before bringing this review to an end, there is one more matter that I want to mention which has tended to become buried in the course of my discussion. A world view will include all of the beliefs of a particular social group, not only principia but reasoned beliefs as well. This is the case because there would not be principia without reasoned beliefs, and *vice versa*, for the existence of these two broad types of belief is dependent upon the structure of the entire set of beliefs. In other words, the distinction between principia and reasoned beliefs is a way of characterizing the system of belief. So, a world

²⁷ These are the kinds of problems that are treated in sociology of knowledge, another discipline which (just as in the case of world view studies) combines both philosophical and social scientific skills. Representative works on the sociology of knowledge are: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (New York, 1947); Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1936).
view includes the entire system of believing and justifying as it is found in a particular group of persons. Principia are, perhaps, of more interest because they do convey much of the "flavor" of a world view. And indeed, some small changes in a group's reasoned beliefs will not have as large an effect, in many cases, as will changes in principia. Yet we must realize that the whole system is important, for it is in terms of this whole that the distinctions I have offered can be made.
CHAPTER IV

COMMON SENSE

The preceding discussion was based within the context of developing an account of the logical structure of a single world view. I argued that a world view is a belief system, and I showed how such a thesis is plausible. However, during that discussion I did not touch upon the kinds of problems one finds when dealing with a multiplicity of world views in an intercultural context. The picture with which the practicing student of world views is confronted arises as a result of his awareness of a considerable variance among the world views found in various cultures around the world. One can find a similar condition within the historical dimension in that the world view of a single culture appears to change over a period of time. Indeed, the notion of a world view was originally created in order to account for certain differences noted between one culture (or epoch) and another. Gaining an understanding of the way in which different world views are related is an important task given the context in which world view studies operates. Thus, I need to show how my characterization of world views can be used to deal with the kind of issues which arise during the course of studying the world views of differing cultures and epochs.
I shall begin this part of the essay with a brief examination of the position advanced by Benjamin Lee Whorf. His views have received considerable attention; and they are important for the discussion at hand in that they present a way of characterizing world views which differs from that which I have advanced. Furthermore, beginning with his proposals is an excellent way of taking up the kinds of issues one is likely to encounter when dealing with more than one culture.

1. Conceptual Systems and Relativism

Whorf held that any given language contains an implicit metaphysics or world view, for he states that "every language contains terms that have come to attain cosmic scope of reference, that crystallize in themselves the basic postulates of an unformulated philosophy, in which is couched the thought of a people, a culture, a civilization, even of an era." I take it that what Whorf is saying here is that for a given language, certain concepts cluster in such a way so as to form implicit "postulates" which in turn constitute a world view. So far this does not greatly differ from what I have had to say about principia, for a principium is represented in words or concepts

whenever it is expressed or thought. But after this point, my account and Whorf's view diverge, for my contention has been that in principia concepts are brought together to form a belief, whereas Whorf seems to be suggesting that the force of the "postulates" he mentions arises from the concepts alone, from the unique way in which these concepts "cut up experience." Concerning this point, consider the following comments advanced by Whorf.

We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds -- and this means largely the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significance as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way -- an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, BUT ITS TERMS ARE ABSOLUTELY OBLIGATORY; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data which the agreement decree.s.

Thus, for Whorf, a world view is not a belief system, rather it is a conceptual system, a way of organizing experience which arises from the basic concepts and patterns of concepts (grammar) found in a particular language.

The notion that world views are conceptual systems is one thesis I wanted to isolate in Whorf's writings; the

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2Whorf, 213. Cf. 214, 221-222, 240.
claim that such conceptual systems are relative and that they are not intertranslatable is a second thesis I want to display from Whorf's work. Whorf postulated what he called the "linguistic relativity principle" which means that:

users of markedly different grammars are pointed by their grammars toward different types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as observers but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world.³

The following is a somewhat parallel account (from an earlier article) of this same relativity principle which adds a few details.

... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. The person most nearly free in such respects would be a linguist familiar with very many different linguistic systems. As yet no linguist is in any such position. We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated.

... When Semitic, Chinese, Tibetan, or African languages are contrasted with our own, the divergence in analysis of the world becomes more apparent; and, when we bring in the native languages of the Americas, where speech communities for many millenniums have gone their ways independently of each other and of the Old World, the fact that languages dissect nature in many different ways becomes patent. The relativity of all conceptual systems, ours included, and their dependence upon language stand revealed.⁴

³Whorf, 221.
⁴Whorf, 214-215.
The relativity principle amounts to a claim that a world view or conceptual system is not translatable into another world view or conceptual system. That much is made clear in the following statement.

Just as it is possible to have any number of geometries other than the Euclidean which give an equally perfect account of space configurations, so it is possible to have descriptions of the universe, all equally valid, that do not contain our familiar contrasts of time and space. The relativity viewpoint of modern physics is one such view conceived in mathematical terms, and the Hopi Weltanschauung is another and quite different one, nonmathematical and linguistic.

Thus, the Hopi language and culture conceals a METAPHYSICS, such as our so-called naive view of space and time does, or as the relativity theory does; yet it is a different metaphysics from either. In order to describe the structure of the universe according to the Hopi, it is necessary to attempt -- insofar as it is possible -- to make explicit this metaphysics, properly describable only in the Hopi language, by means of an approximation expressed in our own language, somewhat inadequately it is true, yet by availing ourselves of such concepts as we have worked up into relative consonance with the system underlying the Hopi view of the universe. 5

To summarize, there is good reason for attributing two theses to Whorf. One is the claim that world views are basically conceptual systems consisting of basic concepts organized according to grammatical patterns (or other linguistic patterns). The second is the view that there is no reality independent of such linguistic conceptual systems and that each of these conceptual systems or world views is not properly describable in any language other

5Whorf, 58, emphasis added.
than its home language. I shall refer to the former notion as the "conceptual system theory of the nature of world views" and the latter I shall describe as the "relativity thesis."

2. The Relativist's Dilemma

Whorf's relativity thesis leads to the following difficulty which I shall call the relativist's dilemma. Premises in the dilemma will be indicated by indentation and Roman numerals in order to distinguish them from supporting comments. It is given that in describing a world view or conceptual system other than our own, we are speaking from within our conceptual system. Let our conceptual system be labelled S. We encounter another culture and observe how their ways of thought and conception differ from ours, and in accordance with Whorf's position, we posit another conceptual system, T, to explain this difference. We would now seem to have two alternatives if we want to speak about concepts in T in terms of concepts from S.

I. Either concepts from T are representable in terms of concepts from S, or concepts from T are not representable in terms of concepts from S.

II. If the first alternative is true, then we must drop Whorf's thesis. Given the truth of the first alternative, Whorf's relativity thesis would be unnecessary (if not false); for if there is no concept from T that is
not in principle representable in S, then there is no need or rationale for positing another Whorfian conceptual system for T as a way of handling the other culture's concepts since we can deal with all their concepts in terms of concepts from S. T could differ from S in that it might lack a concept that is found in S. For example, people of the T tribe might lack the concept "atom bomb." But, given the truth of the first alternative, these people could easily be taught this concept in terms of other concepts which they share with us. Similar comments would apply to the case in which T possessed a concept not found in S. One need not travel to a faraway culture to see that it is possible to represent concepts from one conceptual system in terms of another, or that it is possible to learn another conceptual system from the base of a different conceptual system. It occurred to all of us as we grew from child to adult in that during that process we moved through a series of differing conceptual systems (or world views) in the presence of adults who possessed a different system and who served as "teachers" in introducing us into this richer system. I do not intend to try to show here just how this process can take place; I only wish to claim that it can and does occur.6

6 Jean Piaget has devoted a great deal of attention to this problem. His results provide a way of understanding this process which is consistent with the position I have
III. If the second alternative is true, then we must reject Whorf's relativity thesis as being logically unintelligible. Suppose we take from T a specific concept t and try to represent it in terms of concepts from S. According to Whorf's relativity thesis, we would be unable to do that, even though we used many concepts from S, for Whorf tells us that in principle no representation of t can properly be made in terms of S. Now if t cannot be represented in terms of concepts from S, we cannot know or verify anything about t, since S is the system within which we are thinking and speaking. This is the case because in order to know or verify something, it must be represented in concepts. So, Whorf's view amounts to saying in terms of concepts from S, that there is something, for example t, which is beyond the reach of representation and knowledge in S. Now it is generally unintelligible on logical grounds (that is, it is a self-contradiction) to put oneself in the position of positing an entity or concept in

been advancing concerning the nature of world views. His studies have considerable weight in that they combine excellent logical analysis of key issues with perceptive empirical observation of actual childhood behavior in an experimental setting. A good summary of Piaget's work, as it bears on issues similar to those now being considered, is found in "The Mental Development of the Child," from Six Psychological Studies (New York, 1967). There are very notable and important lines of theoretical similarity between Piaget and Peirce. For a sample of this, one might compare the above article by Piaget with Peirce's article of 1868, "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man," CP 5.213f, especially Question Two.
a way such that one is prevented in principle from knowing or conceiving that entity.\(^7\)

IV. The conclusion we reach, therefore, is that Whorf's thesis is either unnecessary or it is unintelligible.\(^8\) Thus, Whorf's proposal is logically unintelligible, for it characterizes other world views in a way such that the thesis that there is another world view besides our own (S), namely that there is T, is a thesis which is essentially unverifiable since its concrete content for any given case (for instance, the case involving T discussed above) cannot in principle be described or represented — we are "trapped" within S as it were.

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\(^7\) I suppose that Kant's Ding an Sich is a classic example of this mistake. The argument I have used here is an instance of a more general kind of argument against the existence of unknowables or incognizables which is found in Peirce; see CP 5.213f., note especially 254-258.

\(^8\) This same kind of dilemma appears in other clothing if one attempts to apply something like Whorf's position to the historical context by claiming that a new conceptual system is not properly describable in terms of an older conceptual system (or vice versa), these two conceptual systems being the result of conceptual change within a single culture or civilization. Here we simply replace S with something like "oldthink" and T with "newthink." Stephen Toulmin may be involved in this historical version of the dilemma; see "Conceptual Revolutions in Science," Synthese, 17 (1967), 75-91; cf. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1962). For a careful criticism of the Kuhn-Toulmin view, see Carl R. Kordig, "The Theory-Ladenness of Observation," The Review of Metaphysics, 24 (1971), 448-484.
Whorf's relativity thesis, it would now seem, does not accomplish what it was intended to accomplish. I take it that it was originally presented as a way of explaining a phenomenon which both Whorfians and non-Whorfians would admit as being real -- the perceived differences in systems of thought (world views) in different cultures or epochs. The explanation advanced by Whorf (an explanation which purports to show the nature of world views in such a way as to account for their differences and for the way in which they are related one to another) fails because, on examination, we see that it treats the phenomenon to be explained as being in principle unknowable and incognizable. Now that cannot be an explanation of the phenomenon under study, for it is no explanation to say (as Whorf in effect must say if he is to retain the relativity thesis in the strong way he presents it), "This phenomenon is a mystery in that there is nothing we can say about it or know of it." It is no explanation to say, of that which one desires an explanation, that it is in principle unknowable (is beyond representation in terms of concepts). That is instead only a disguised way of refusing to explain it.

An added argument is now possible given the nature of these findings. That is, Whorf's way of explaining the phenomena usually characterized as being differing world views leads to the position that world views other than
the speaker's are in principle unknowable. But, as a matter of fact, we are, in some way, able to come to know and to understand world views other than our own. From these two premisses we can conclude that Whorf's hypothesis is disconfirmed. What this indicates, therefore, is that we require another way of explaining the nature of world views and the way in which they are related. Of course, I will be attempting to show how my proposal that world views are belief systems can handle these kinds of difficulties. But before going on to that, I want to offer a few comments concerning the assertion that world views are essentially conceptual systems which was the first of the two theses I isolated in Whorf's writings, the second being the relativity thesis which I have been discussing.

One could reply to my comments on Whorf's relativity thesis by admitting that my criticism of that part of his view is valid, but then one could claim that Whorf's characterization of world views as being essentially conceptual systems is basically sound. Now I do not want to deny that a world view involves concepts nor that the concepts which it employs are organized in some kind of systematic way such that this organization can be understood and characterized by linguists or other scholars. But I do want to insist that the description of a world view as being only a conceptual system does not go far enough, since there are features which that thesis does not explain. In
order to show why this is the case, I want to consider an imaginary dialogue between myself and another person, Jones. Here I will be assuming that we have different world views and that adequate translation between these two world views is possible.

Suppose that Jones and I are discussing the sentence, "There is only one god." Jones, being from a culture that is radically different from mine, tells me that he understands very well what I mean when I speak that sentence, but he says that it is not true, for according to him, there are several gods. I, in turn, tell him that I understand what he means when he says that there are several gods, but I tell him that his statement is not true. Jones further explains to me that not only is his sentence true, but he lives his life according to it, he always acts on the basis of it, he justifies many of his activities in terms of it, and he would be terribly upset and somewhat at a loss if he behaved in any other way. I say similar things about my sentence which proclaims monotheism. In addition, we declare to each other that each of us has very serious doubts about the sentence which the other offers.

To speak of this dialogue in terms of conceptual systems would seem to limit one to explaining only that a meaningful and intelligible sentence was spoken and understood by the two parties, and that the concepts in the
sentences were organized according to some kinds of proper grammatical or linguistic principles. There are, however, phenomena still remaining to be accounted for. Jones says that his sentence is true, that mine is false, and that he acts in terms of his sentence, would be "lost" without it, justifies many things in terms of it, and in general, he claims, it reflects his style of life. I shall describe this as a list of "plus" features. Jones is saying, then, that he understands what both he and I mean with our sentences, but that something is lacking...and here Jones adds all the plus features. Talk about concepts and conceptual systems will probably be very relevant to any problems that arise concerning how to deal with what Jones and I mean, but such talk does not account for the plus features. In expressing these additional features, Jones is telling me that he has a habit of which the plus features are descriptive. Now this habit is precisely a belief of the kind I have described in earlier chapters: namely (in this particular case) it is a principium.

Thus, differences in world views are not to be explained in terms of extremely relative conceptual systems, since that kind of extreme relativism is self-defeating. Because it is self-defeating, we must assume that translation between conceptual systems is possible (indeed, it is actual in that it is done). If translation between conceptual systems is possible such that persons having
different world views can understand what each other mean, then the difference between world views must lie in some features other than strictly conceptual considerations. These features are the kind of things one describes under the rubric of belief, so we must now consider how the notion of a belief system can be used to provide an account of the kinds of differences found to exist between world views without becoming involved in a self-defeating relativism.

3. Human Universals

Having disposed of Whorfian relativism and its related view of the way in which different world views are interrelated, it is left for me to supply a positive account of that relationship in terms which are consistent with my own thesis about the nature of world views. As a first step toward that goal, I must make explicit an assumption or belief, a presupposition if you will, which is basic to world view studies, although it is sometimes overlooked. This assumption or belief which students of world views hold is that the native informant with whom the student of world view speaks (in order to elicit his world view) is a human being, a person. One does not in such cases speak with a culture, as some folklorists and
anthropologists of the "superorganic" school might lead us to think. In addition to this assumption on the part of

Among anthropologists, two scholars representative of this viewpoint are: A. L. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (Chicago, 1952), especially the essay entitled "The Superorganic"; Leslie White, The Science of Culture (New York, 1949). Among folklorists, a figure representative of this approach is Stith Thompson; see The Folktale (New York, 1946). Robert Redfield (whose views I have discussed in chapter I) seems to have been aware of the assumption I am discussing now, as the following comments (worth quoting at length here) would indicate. These three paragraphs are from The Little Community, p. 93 (emphasis added).

The "ethnographical dilemma" is the scientist's form of the problem encountered in our common-sense life as the problem of "intercultural understanding." How are we to understand another people through definitions of experience that are different from those we are trying to understand? Ultimately it is the problem of communication and understanding between any two human beings. In all these cases it seems to us that in some circumstances understanding is in fact reached. And in all of them the way to understanding seems to lie through an alternation of talking and listening. One talks to the other, expressing one's self to him so that he may interpret your signals to him through a projection of himself into you. And then one listens to him with the best projection of one's own sympathetic feelings and thought about the other that one can achieve, held in suspense and made subject to correction.

The simple fact seems to be that to study and to report the way of life of another people one must begin by assuming, as common sense assumes in trying to reach understanding in talking with another person, that something is the same in that way of life and one's own. One cannot listen meaningfully to another without supposing [believing] that there is something in his way of conceiving things and of judging that is the same as one's own. The concept, the scientist's effort to make this explicit, is a kind of hearing device. It states these assumptions as to what may be the same in the outlook of that other and in my own outlook. Even the most external view of another's culture, in terms perhaps of his observed habits of work, contributes something to
the student of world view, one will also find a similar assumption or belief on the part of the native informant who decides to speak with the stranger. That is, the "native" informant believes that the "strange" scholar is a human being or person. 10

It is not simply an accident that students of world view would have this kind of assumption. These scholars, whether they be anthropologists or folklorists, are students of man. It would be possible for one to believe, as racists sometimes seem to have believed, that a particular group of creatures are not men, but are only man-like animals, or near-men, or missing links, or some such thing. But note that the adoption of this belief as a methodological assumption makes one something else than a student of scientific knowledge and to "intercultural understanding" too. A developed concept of world view would attempt to represent much more of that other's understanding of things. But that concept too assumes that there is something in what I am trying to find out about that is the same as that which I already know in myself, in my own view of things.

Our neighbors are a little different from us, the peasant peoples of Macedonia a little more different; in India, in New Guinea, there is something more alien; and yet we cannot go so far as to reach entirely beyond the familiar.

10 For confirmation of these points, see: Marcel Griaule, Conversations with Ogotemmeli: An Introduction to Dogon Religious Ideas (London, 1965); Carlos Castaneda, The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge (New York, 1969), and A Separate Reality: Further Conversations with Don Juan (New York, 1971).
man. One would be a student of animal behavior perhaps, 'animal' being understood as meaning "other than man," in this case. Now if one were to try to talk to what one initially thought was a group of animals and one were to try to listen to them, one would already have the beginning of a belief that they might be men, that they might be persons. And if they were to answer our attempts at communication with their own communicative acts, thus seeming to also consider that we are persons too, then there is the start of the kind of joint assumption I have been indicating. When our communication with this group of creatures reached the point of being a rich dialogue and an interchange of complex ideas, we would see, then, the belief that both speaker and listener are human beings; this is the type of belief I find to exist in the practice of world view studies.

In light of the assumption that data for world view studies are generated through conversations with fellow human beings, I think that a case can also be made for the view that there are certain characteristics which one would concede whenever that assumption is made. There are certain cognitive behaviors and capabilities, which I shall call Human Universals, that are found in all cultures simply because of the presence of persons in these cultures. Here I have in mind such things as communicating with language, learning new concepts or skills, perceiving, reasoning,
and believing, including the process Peirce calls "fixation of belief" which is constituted by the passage from a state of belief to a state of doubt and back to a state of belief. Thus, while there are different languages, communication by persons is a human universal; while each culture's educational system might be unique in certain ways, all normal persons in a particular culture are able to learn; while some persons reason well (not in the sense of logical theory, but in the sense of everyday reasoning) and others poorly, reasoning is found worldwide; while beliefs differ among persons, believing and doubting are common to all men. It should be noted that these human universals are common human cognitive abilities. They should be contrasted with (although they are not entirely unrelated to) what have been called universal cultural patterns or cultural universals. Underlying each of these human universals one will find a content which will be common to all instances of its occurrence in human beings. Part of this content can be characterized, for each human universal, as a set of beliefs or habits of action; these I shall designate as Universal Beliefs, since they will be common to all humanity. Following Peircean

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terminology, the entire set of universal beliefs are appropriately known as Common Sense.

Here one might ask for the reason why human universals are found in all societies. I see two ways of defending this claim, both of which appear to be valid. For one thing, the student of world view assumes that the creatures with which he converses are human beings, and he must also presume that these creatures have a world view, otherwise he would not be interviewing these persons, for it is his object to study world views. And his assumption that these men have a world view, admittedly different from his own, commits him to the assumption that these men have beliefs, that they are able to perform questioning and inquiry, and that they have a system of justifying beliefs. Given, for example, that the natives with which the student converses are capable of doubting (as the student of world view assumes), they will have certain beliefs in common with the student, because doubting or questioning can operate only if certain very broad beliefs are presupposed, and these presuppositions of doubting will be the same among men the world over. A similar kind of argument could be applied to the other human universals I have mentioned in that the student of world view will assume that the persons he interviews can do such things as justify or inquire or believe, since these kinds of activities are required for having a world view system. Thus, the two assumptions
made by the student of world view, namely that his informants are men and that they have a world view, commits the student of world view to the consequences of these assumptions, namely that certain human universals are required in order to have a world view, and that these human universals presuppose certain beliefs which can be brought to one's attention through logical analysis.

However, there is a second consideration that can be brought to bear upon the question of the presence of human universals. Human universals are the kinds of skills and behaviors that are required if one is to be recognizably human, and since the student of world view (or any student of man) must assume that his informants are human beings, he must concede that they are in possession of human universals which are aspects of what it is to be human. Space is lacking for me to give a complete set of arguments along this line for all the human universals I have mentioned, but it will be possible to sketch the general procedure one could follow by giving an example in terms of questioning or doubting. This example will be especially appropriate in that I have already developed many of the necessary details in an earlier chapter.

In broad terms, the argument runs as follows. All normal men have grown from childhood to adulthood. Expressing this in terms which anthropologists favor, one could say that all men must learn a language and a culture.
Failure to do this usually results in some form of sanction or enforced separation from the main group. I suppose that it is not a logical or a "necessary" fact that all men "grow up." It is imaginable that a person could somehow spring into existence as a complete human being, much in the way that Minerva is said to have sprung from the head of Zeus, fully grown and fully a person. No matter which way one wishes to classify epistemically the initial statement in this paragraph, I presume that it is true. This "growing up" requires that one be able to learn. One must learn facts or knowledge, new skills, acquire new beliefs that one did not have as an infant, and one must learn a language. One who could not accomplish these feats of learning would fail to become a human being in the normal sense. Much of the learning that it is necessary for one to accomplish in this process of fully becoming a human being can be characterized as inquiry. By this I mean the very broad sense of that term which Peirce uses -- the process of passing from a state of belief through doubt back to a new state of belief. The nature of inquiry being what it is, that process cannot operate without the inquirer being able to doubt or question. And, as I hope to

12Cf. Piaget's discussion of this point in the work cited above. I take it that Piaget's term "equilibrium" and the process of equilibration is structurally parallel to what Peirce calls inquiry.
show in the next section, being able to doubt requires the presence of certain beliefs which will be common to all instances of doubting.

This second way of answering someone who is skeptical about human universals is a stronger and more comprehensive approach than the first. Indeed, the second may be part or all of the reason why a student of world view will assume the presence of human universals: that is, perhaps the reason why he assumes their presence is because of a not-too-clearly felt awareness that to be human is to possess human universals. And as I mentioned above, I cannot offer arguments for all the human universals that one might be able to list, but in order to strengthen the case for human universals and universal beliefs, I want to provide a more detailed discussion of one instance. Since I have already discussed questioning at some length, it will be convenient to use that as an example of a human

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13 This would, of course, be a vast undertaking if one were aiming at exhaustiveness. Examples of scholars who have undertaken to accomplish this task in the general case of language use (conceived as a human universal) are Peirce and Cassirer. Peirce attacks this task in his theory of signs in that he views man as a user of signs and tries to develop the implications of such an assumption. For a relatively concise explication of Peirce's theory of signs, see Joseph Ransdell, "Charles Peirce: The Idea of Representation," Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1966. Cassirer approaches much the same problem in rather similar terms in his three volume work, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (New Haven, 1953).
universal in showing how universal beliefs can be discerned. In working through these matters, I shall return to a consideration of Peirce's Critical Common-Sensism, for it is a way of attacking this very issue. I should add that in what follows it is not my intention to provide a definitive study of Peirce's Critical Common-Sensism. My motive is to consider relevant portions of the view in order to illuminate the topic at hand, an examination of the nature of world views.

14 The following papers from CP deal with Critical Common-Sensism: "What Pragmatism Is," 5.411f.; "Issues of Pragmaticism," 5.438f.; "Pragmaticism and Critical Common-Sensism," 5.497f.; "Consequences of Critical Common-Sensism," 5.502f.; "The Reality of God," 6.494f.; "To Signor Calderoni, On Pragmaticism," 8.205f.; "Vitally Important Topics" (the first lecture of a series entitled "Detached Ideas on Vitally Important Topics"), 1.616f. The following manuscripts deal with Critical Common-Sensism: The Basis of Pragmaticism Series, MS 279-284; Materials for Monist Article, The Consequences of Pragmaticism (a two volume notebook), MS 288; Issues of Pragmaticism, MS 290; The Bed-Rock Beneath Pragmaticism, MS 300; Critical Common Sense and Religion, MS 846-857; A Sketch of Logical Critic, MS 673; Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise of Human Nature," MS 939; Reason's Rules, MS 596-600; 857 untitled. These lists of articles and manuscripts should not be regarded as exhaustive. They represent only the major sources; there are numerous small references to aspects of this doctrine scattered throughout Peirce's work. Peirce traced the roots of his version of the philosophy of common sense to the so-called Scotch Common Sense School,
4. Universal Beliefs

If we look at questioning as an act of communication in an interpersonal dialogue (as opposed to its use in self-dialogue), we can easily notice an implicit belief which will be universal (because this kind of questioning is a human universal). Someone who seriously poses such a question does not have the answer himself. He raises this question because he thinks that he can thereby obtain the answer. All this would not make any sense, however, if the questioner did not believe that he was addressing the question to some other person, or producer of signs, who is an intelligent being like the

Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart primarily. The principal works by these two men are: Reid, Philosophical Works, ed. Sir William Hamilton (Hildesheim, Ger., 1967), 2 vols.; Stewart, Collected Works, ed. Sir William Hamilton (London, 1854-1858). Scottish Common-sensism was a popular philosophy in America before and during Peirce's lifetime. On this point, see Joseph L. Blau, Men and Movements in American Philosophy (New York, 1952), 92, 104, 107; I. Woodbridge Riley, American Philosophy (New York, 1958), 18; Herbert W. Schneider, A History of American Philosophy (New York, 1963), 216-220; Arthur Kenyon Rogers, English and American Philosophy Since 1800 (New York, 1922). The "Scottish Philosophy" has been the object of renewed interest both in the United Kingdom and in America; G. E. Moore's brand of common sense philosophy may have had something to do with this.
questioner. So we see that a questioner presupposes that there is some kind of personality (other than himself) that has some kind of intelligence. Furthermore, this kind of belief is presupposed in interpersonal communicative acts of many different kinds; it is not simply limited to this kind of questioning. In expressing the general version of this universal belief, Peirce phrased it in the following way.

"... It is impossible to doubt [i.e., everyone does believe] that a man who uses language is intelligent in some sense which implies an element of consciousness."\(^{15}\)

Concomitantly with the belief that there are other persons, we can readily see that the questioner presupposes that he is a person, that he exists as a conscious communicator, a user of signs or language who can communicate with other persons.

The following statement from Peirce's essay, "The Fixation of Belief," calls attention to other features of questioning which can be seen to be universal beliefs.

The feeling which gives rise to any method of fixing belief is a dissatisfaction at two repugnant...

\(^{15}\) MS 288, p. 11.
propositions. But here already is a vague concession that there is some one thing which a proposition should represent. Nobody, therefore, can really doubt [i.e., everyone does believe] that there are Reals, for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. The hypothesis, therefore, is one which every mind admits.¹⁶

By "nobody" I take it that Peirce means any normal human being in any culture within any world view. The phrase, "any method of fixing belief," refers to the four "methods" or types of inquiry which Poirce describes, namely tenacity, authority, taste, and science. Doubting is essential to the initiation of any of these four kinds of inquiry. Thus, since doubting is the incident which provides the occasion for an inquiry (for a "fixing of belief") of any type, and since all human beings undergo the process of inquiry at various times, Peirce is viewing doubting as a human universal. Hence, any beliefs necessary for doubting will be taken as universal beliefs. That this is Peirce's position can be seen in his claim that "every mind admits" particular beliefs presupposed in doubting.

One important aspect (for present purposes) of this comment by Peirce lies in his insistence that a person in doubt presupposes (believes) that there are Reals. By this he means that the questioner or doubter is presuming that there is a real state of affairs, real in the sense

¹⁶CP 5.384, emphasis added.
that its characters are independent of any opinions or fancies the questioner might have about it. The questioner wants the answer that represents reality, for in a serious question, what is being sought is a firm belief that can serve as a proper basis for future action. And, if one wants the answer that represents reality, one is presupposing that there is a reality, independent of one's whims or wishes. If the questioner did not believe that there is a real state of affairs which the answer should represent, he would not put the question either to nature or to another person: he would simply accept whatever notion might be in his consciousness at any one time, even though these notions might be contradictory from one instant to another. The point here is that without believing in a reality independent of one's wishes, the questioner would feel no need to check on his notions. Whatever they might be would be satisfactory, even though they would contradict over a period of time, or indeed, even if they did not contradict one another. No doubt we all acquire this belief that there is a real state of affairs at a very young age when we find our wishes and feelings being thwarted in a most striking way. There we learn that our wishes are not always reliable guides for actions, and we see that sentences representing reality are generally reliable. 17

17 See Question Two in Peirce's "Questions" article, CP 5.225f; also cf. MS 596, pp. 13-14; here Peirce mentions
Besides presuming that there is a real world, a real state of affairs which he wants to represent properly, a questioner also presupposes that this reality is ordered such that just one of the two "repugnant" answers represents it, while the other does not. This goes beyond merely believing that there is a real state of affairs, in that this is a belief about the nature of reality, admittedly very abstract, but important nevertheless. By engaging in a question or doubt, the questioner is displaying a belief that the real world has a nature such that joint statements which are contradictory do not represent it. If the questioner believed that the real universe had no order whatsoever, there would be no difficulty for him in holding that both contradictory answers represented it; it would also be a universe in which no questions or doubts could arise -- there would be nothing to puzzle one, nothing to ask.\textsuperscript{18}

I will not go on to develop any more universal beliefs. The ones I have developed shall suffice as examples for the present essay. My discussion of them has shown the general mode of inference required for discovering universal beliefs. In each case, one must begin with a human

\textsuperscript{18} Peirce develops a similar point in "The Order of Nature" at CP 6.395f.
universal. Then by observing and analyzing the actions of someone practicing that kind of behavior, one is led to see that they are ordered acts, or that they involve habits.\footnote{And I hope that the reader remembers the use of 'habit' intended here. Peirce summarizes it nicely in MS 673, pp. 14-15: "I must premise that I use the word 'habit' in its old, and I think not yet quite obsolete sense, in which it denotes any lasting state whether of a person or a thing, this state consisting in the fact that on any occasion of a certain kind that person or thing would, either certainly or evenly probably behave in a definite way."}

Such a habitual mode of action precisely constitutes a belief. Peirce succinctly summarizes (in regard to one of the universal beliefs I have noted) the line of investigation I have used thus far in a letter to Calderoni, a contemporary Italian proponent of pragmatism: \textit{everybody's actions show that it is impossible to doubt that there is an element of order in the world.}\footnote{CP 8.208, emphasis added.}

To summarize, by concentrating upon one human universal, I have been able to show that the following beliefs are universal in that they are presupposed by persons who engage in this way of acting (namely questioning). I (the questioner) exist as a communicator. Other persons who are also communicators exist. I communicate with these other persons, and they with me. There is a real world. And this world is ordered. In a very abstract manner,
this neatly characterizes my argument, for "everybody's actions" means, taken in the context in which I have been operating, that questioning or doubting is a human universal. And we find, upon examination of this mode of action, that such a belief in some kind of ordered universe is contained in (is presupposed in) that kind of practice, and, in addition to a belief in order, we can find several other universal beliefs, some of which I have noted above.

At this point, it is possible to take note of another feature of universal beliefs. That is, insofar as we continue to employ a human universal, questioning for example, it will not be possible to doubt the belief that there is some order in the universe, or any other belief presupposed by such a practice. Thus, we begin to see that there would be good reason to think that universal beliefs are further characterizable as being indubitable beliefs. In order to see in what way this might be the case, an examination of certain additional aspects of Peirce's Critical Common-Sensism is appropriate.

5. Universal Beliefs as Indubitable Beliefs

What I have accomplished so far can be seen as providing the details for the first element in Critical Common-Sensism. That element is expressed in the following remarks.
It might be well to begin by explaining what I mean by critical common sense. I spoke of pragmaticism as a "more critical variety of the philosophy of common sense." Those who did not pass this expression by as a vague remark probably thought it self-contradictory, since criticism and common sense were the two rival and opposed ways of answering Hume. The meaning I attach to the phrase is that I accept indubitable propositions, after I have been confirmed in holding them to be indubitable by finding (as well as I can) that I myself cannot doubt them, that no other men do so, and that they have practical meanings which experience confirms.21

My discussion of universal beliefs can be taken as filling in most of the details of the procedure of "finding (as well as I can)," a procedure which Peirce does not adequately describe in any of his writings with which I am familiar. But the account of human universals might be thought to be incomplete, since it does not show how universal beliefs are indubitable, a claim which Peirce is (in effect) making here. Thus, I must show how, and in what manner, universal beliefs are indubitable.

Peirce used the term "acritical" to describe the kind of indubitability found in universal beliefs.

Critical Common-Sensism admits that there . . . are indubitable propositions. . . . In one sense, anything evident is indubitable; but the propositions . . . which Critical Common-Sensism holds to be original, in the sense one cannot "go

21MS 288, 7 emphasis added. Cf. 5.509; MS 288, 77, 79; MS 673, 10-11; MS 939, 13. Peirce sometimes does not place this part of his position as first in order of exposition. However, it is found in most of his presentations of the doctrine of Critical Common-Sense.
behind" them (as the lawyers say), are indubitable in the sense of being acritical.22

One can come to see what Peirce meant by the "acritical" sense of indubitability if one takes note of his answer to an objection which alleged that he accepted propositions as indubitable simply because they had not been criticized.

To this charge Peirce replied that

... this confounds two senses of the word "because." Neither the philosophy of Common-Sense nor the man who holds it accepts any belief on the ground that it has not been criticized. For, as already said, such beliefs are not "accepted." What happens is that one comes to recognize that one has had the belief-habit as long as one can remember; and to say that no doubt of it has ever arisen is only another way of saying the same thing. But it is quite true that the Common-Sensist like everybody else, the Criticist included, believes propositions because they have not been criticized in the sense that he does not doubt certain propositions that he would have doubted if he had criticized them. For, to criticize is ipso facto to doubt. ... 23

22 CP 5.440. The word "original" is one of several terms which Peirce used to refer to the phenomena I am calling universal beliefs. In addition to "original," he also employs the following terms to describe common-sense indubitable beliefs: "instinctive," "acritical," "ultimate premises," "absolutely indubitable propositions," "natural beliefs." This use of "original" dates back to Thomas Reid and the Scotch School of Common Sense philosophers.

23 CP 5.523. By the term "Criticist" Peirce means to refer to a rather orthodox Kantian philosophy. Peirce often describes himself as a great admirer of Kant, although he is far from being a disciple.
This is an important passage; it will be helpful to take note of two variants of the same notion from Peirce's unpublished manuscripts.

It [Critical Common-Sensism] points out to begin with that when Criticism accuses it of accepting a belief because it has not been criticized, it confuses two meanings of the word "because." Taking this conjunction as referring to a logical ground of belief, it is not true that common sense accepts any belief for such a reason. It does not accept a belief at all. Once it is a belief, there is nothing to be done but to recognize it as such, as it [CCSism] does, or to make itself [CCSism] believe that it [CCSism] goes through some highly scientific operation that terminates in accepting it [the belief], as other schools (including that of Criticism) are apt to do. The only sense in which Common Sense accepts a belief because it has not been criticized is that the fact of its not having been criticized explains why it is impossible that the belief should be given up, it having been bred in the man long before, perhaps from birth.\(^{24}\)

\(^{24}\)MS 288, p. 54. The fourth sentence in this passage is rather confusing in its original form because Peirce was using 'it' to stand in one case for indubitable belief while in the same sentence also using 'it' to refer to the doctrine of Critical Common-Sensism. By sorting out these ambiguities, one is led to believe that his fourth sentence must have been intended to read something like the following: "Once we have a belief, one can either recognize that one has such a belief (which is what Peirce would do) or one can pretend (as the "Criticist" does) that one has gone through some highly scientific operation which terminated in the acceptance of this belief." Peirce goes on to say that in this case, the proper alternative is the former one because original beliefs are not the result of any scientific reasoning; indeed they make such reasoning possible (see CP 5.522). And he implies that an acceptance of the latter alternative would be a form of self-deception.
Here is a second variant from a manuscript entitled "A Sketch of Logical Critic."

When a boy's eyes are first opened to the critical life, he finds himself -- if he happens to think of it -- already possessed, in common with everyone else, by a body of beliefs called collectively "common sense." He may happen to reflect that, among so many beliefs, some are likely to be false; but it will be impossible for him, at first, to entertain any doubt of a single one individually, since he finds he does believe it -- that is to say, he is subject to a strong habit such that if he be asked by himself or by another, whether he believes it or not, he will be obliged to say he does, and if he were put into such a situation that his conduct must testify to the reality of his belief, such an experiment would prove that he did. Now neither boy nor man possesses such freedom of will that he can instantly cut loose from a strong habit without any reason or cause for doing so.

. . . But it is one of the essentials of belief, without which it would not be belief, that it brings peace of mind, or at least relief from the struggle of doubt; so that a man could hardly be considered sane who should wish that, though the facts should remain lamentable, he should believe them to be such as he would wish them to be. Certainly, no boy with a mind vigorous enough, not to say athletic enough, to question matters of common sense, could possibly wish to be rid of his belief in such a way. 25

Of these three passages, the second will, I believe, give us a clue by means of which we can come to understand the other two. 26

25 MS 673, pp. 10-11.

26 Someone might pause to remind me that the second quote is from an unpublished manuscript, the implication being that a published version should be more authoritative than material from a notebook. For purposes of studying many writers, this is probably a sound principle of scholarship. However, I am convinced that something like its opposite would be better in Peirce's case. It is not
It is fairly clear that the case Peirce rejects can be summarized by saying that the acceptance of universal beliefs is not the result of an inference from the premiss, "Universal beliefs are not criticized." That is, Peirce rejects the following argument: universal beliefs are not criticized, therefore, I accept universal beliefs. This premiss, according to Peirce, does not logically justify an inference to that conclusion. Furthermore, Peirce here rejects one meaning of "because" and "accept" — he states that universal beliefs are not accepted in the way in which one accepts a conclusion on the basis of (because of) an argument. Thus, in regard to universal beliefs he has rejected one sense of "because" and one sense of "accept," those meanings of these two words in which argumentation plays a part. However, he does think that these two words

unusual to find Peirce expressing himself more explicitly in his manuscript notes than in published papers which draw on the same set of ideas. The published redactions are typically more abstract and compressed. Peirce admitted this openly.

I beg my reader also to believe that it would be impossible for me to put into these articles over two percent of the pertinent thought which would be necessary in order to present the subject as I have worked it out. I can only make a small selection of what it seems most desirable to submit to his judgement. Not only must all steps be omitted which he can be expected to supply for himself, but unfortunately much more that may cause him difficulty. (CP 5.443; this is from a published paper.)

So, I shall focus upon the second passage in order to attempt a reconstruction of part of the "omitted" portion of Peirce's view at this point.
can be appropriately used here if one takes them in another sense. We can come to accept our universal beliefs in the sense of that word which means "recognize," or "acknowledge," or "come to be aware of." This is implicit in the alternatives Peirce mentions: either recognize that we have a belief or pretend that we have gone through some form of criticism or scientific inquiry which terminates in the argumentative kind of acceptance. Peirce chooses the first alternative because, as a matter of fact, we do not now go through criticism or argumentation to "arrive" at universal beliefs. As he said in the third quotation, we often come to realize that we have certain beliefs, and have always had them as long as we can remember; and we have no memory of ever having developed such beliefs through argumentation or criticism. So the only thing to do is to acknowledge (the second sense of "accept") that we have these beliefs. Having arrived at this point, to complete the discussion, we can now call upon "because" in the second sense in which Peirce uses it. He does employ "because" to mean "is explained by" or "is accounted for by." Hence the final sentence of the second quotation has the following meaning. The impossibility of giving up a universal belief is explained by (is because of) the fact that this belief has not been criticized, for (as Peirce said in the first quotation) to criticize involves doubting as a necessary condition. One should add that doubting is the only way
in which one can be put into a position so that one can give up a belief. Thus, since we do not, as a matter of fact, doubt universal beliefs, and since they are acritical (for in order to apply criticism we must have a real doubt which is lacking in the case of universal beliefs), the only alternative left is to simply recognize (become aware) that we have them as our beliefs.

At this point, one might ask why we come to have universal beliefs. Here my account of human universals provides an explanation which supplements Peirce's position -- universal beliefs (Peirce's acritical indubitable beliefs) are presupposed by persons as they behave in the ways that I have called human universals. Human universals are, in turn, aspects of what it is to be recognizably human. Why are there human universals? I can only say that they exist. Peirce speculated that they are of the nature of instincts.27

27 Concerning Peirce's doctrine that the ways of acting I call human universals are based upon human instincts, see CP 5.445; 5.498; 5.511; also MS 288, pp. 105, 109. Here again it might be edifying to compare Peirce's speculations that human universals are "instincts" with the results obtained by Piaget in studying the mental development of children.

From a functional point of view, i.e., if we take into consideration the general motives of behavior and thought, there are constant functions common to all ages. At all levels of development, action presupposes a precipitating factor: a psychological, affective, or intellectual need. (In the latter case, the need appears in the guise of a question
In terms of my overall discussion, the claim that universal beliefs are indubitable, a claim which Peirce has (in effect) made, means that no one hesitates to act deliberately in ways that presuppose those beliefs; that is, we see that no one doubts these beliefs. For such a doubt, if it were real, would be displayed in action in the form of a suspension or interruption of these human universals, practices such as questioning or perceiving. As a technique for clarification, let me state this whole point in a manner which reverses the order of the account I have provided. Given the nature of doubt and belief as I have presented it, what would an indubitable proposition (one for which doubt is impossible) be like? It would be a proposition which everyone believed. And so long as it is believed, it will not be doubted; so long as it is not doubted it will be acritical. Are there any propositions which

or problem.) At all levels, intelligence seeks to understand or to explain, etc. However, while the functions of interest, explanations, etc., are common to all developmental stages, that is to say, are "invariable" as far as the functions themselves are concerned, it is nonetheless true that "interests" (as opposed to "interest") vary considerably from one mental level to another, and that the particular explanations (as opposed to the function of explaining) are of a very different nature, depending on the degree of intellectual development. In addition to the constant functions, there are the variable structures. An analysis of these progressive forms of successive equilibrium highlights the differences from one behavioral level to another, all the way from the elementary behavior of the neonate through adolescence. (Piaget, pp. 4-5.)
everyone believes? Yes, for example the universal beliefs noted above. And upon closer examination we see that such beliefs are presupposed in the modes of acting I have called human universals.

6. Objections

It is appropriate to pause at this point to consider a few objections that might be brought against the foregoing views. Someone might complain by urging that although one has not doubted universal beliefs before because one was unaware of those beliefs, now that they are recognized, one will be able to doubt them. If it is the case that this recognition is accompanied by a real doubt, one would be doing right to start an inquiry into the truth of such a proposition. But one must take care at this point to ensure that this is a real doubt, not just a mere paper doubt. For one might be operating under the mistaken assumption that one can doubt at will, what Peirce calls the Cartesian error. 28

28 In CP 5.265 (number 1), Peirce urges that the prejudices one has as one begins to study philosophy cannot be dispelled by a maxim such as that proposed by Descartes in his first Meditation. The Cartesian doctrine against which this is a reaction is very adequately displayed in the following comment which is from Descartes' response to some criticisms of the Meditations which were assembled by Clerselier (The Philosophical Works of Descartes, translated by Haldane and Ross, volume 2, New York: 1911, p. 126).

They notice three criticisms directed against the first Meditation: 1. That I demand an
It is not possible to doubt a given belief at will, for if it were possible to do so, that would show that one did not have a belief in the first place.

For belief, while it lasts, is a strong habit, and as such, forces the man to believe until some surprise breaks up the habit. The breaking up of a belief can only be due to some novel experience, whether external or internal. Now experience which could be summoned up at pleasure would not be experience. 29

Consider also this version of the same idea, offered in response to a similar objection.

You [the objector] talk as if beliefs were under the believer's immediate control. If they were, they would not be beliefs. No other habits are capable of being so instantaneously battered by the proper means; but none others are so strong. Like many-tumbler locks, they open only to a key that fits. The original beliefs are like rusty locks that do not open even to the proper keys without working them repeatedly and wearing down the crust. 30

impossibility in desiring the abandonment of every kind of prejudice. . . .

The first of these criticisms is due to the author of this book [Gassendi, the author of this objection] not having reflected that the word prejudice does not apply to all the notions in our mind, of which it is impossible to divest ourselves, but only to all those opinions our belief in which is a result of previous judgments. And since judging or refraining from judging is an act of the will, as I have explained in the appropriate place, it is evident that it is under our control; for in order to rid one's self of all prejudice, nothing needs to be done except to resolve to affirm or deny none of these matters we have previously affirmed or denied. . . .

29 CP 5.524.

30 MS 288, pp. 69, 73. Cf. MS 598; MS 596.
So, if it is possible to doubt a proposition at will, that shows that it was never believed in the first place; hence the situation envisioned in the objection is not the situation I am discussing; for what is under consideration here are universal beliefs (or candidates for universal beliefs) which are propositions that are now believed. One might say that just as paper doubts might be effective with paper beliefs, in order to affect real beliefs, a real doubt is required. This objection gets its force from a confusion of such paper doubts with real doubts. This is understandable, for as Peirce said, "No mistake is more likely than that of taking a paper-doubt for the real metal." \(^{31}\)

The person objecting might be persistent in that he could state that he has examined the matter carefully and he does indeed genuinely doubt one of the propositions I have described as being a universal belief, for example, that there is an element of order in the universe. Peirce admits that it could happen that universal beliefs could seem to be absent. But this is only an illusion.

You talk like Descartes, as if those beliefs were written on the mind as on a slate with a soapstone pencil so that the brush of a wet sponge would obliterate them. In truth it is as rather as if they were marked with talc on the man's 'glassy essence' so that though they may seem to be gone, they will reappear as soon as the slightest occasion arises. \(^{32}\)

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\(^{31}\)CP 5.445.

\(^{32}\)MS 288, p. 101. The reference to "man's glassy
Peirce is saying here, so it seems to me, that in order to be sure that one actually doubts a universal belief, one should take a close look at one's actions over a period of time. The belief in an element of order in the universe, for example, will display itself in our action if it is still present. As I have shown, in comments made earlier, doubting is a form of action which presupposes such a belief. So, a person who is correct when he claims that he doubts this universal belief should suffer from an inability to have normal doubts or to raise normal questions, this inability beginning with the onset of the putative doubt of this universal belief. However, I suspect that if this skeptic will carefully observe his later actions, he will probably see that he continues, from time to time, to ask normal questions and to have normal doubts. Thus, we can see that his putative doubt of this universal belief would not be genuine. All the skeptic would have succeeded in accomplishing here would be to pronounce the words, "I doubt that there is an element of order in the universe."

Similar considerations would apply to situations in which a person might claim to genuinely doubt any of the other universal beliefs. So, as Peirce put it, universal beliefs

" essence" is probably meant to bring to mind Peirce's article of the same name (see CP 6.238f.) which deals with the nature of a person.
are a part of man's "glassy essence"; that is, they are essential for being recognizably human. Therein lies the source of their security.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The time has come to consider my overall argument in some kind of perspicuous manner. In order to provide a diversity in exposition, I shall summarize the topics I have raised in roughly the reverse order in which they were introduced in the essay.

I have argued that there is a set of beliefs that are common to all men, or at least, that the student of man must assume that there is such a set of beliefs which any rational human being will exhibit. All rational men are possessed of a set of capabilities which I refer to as human universals. Among these are the ability to communicate with language, the ability to learn, the ability to reason and to have beliefs, and the ability to question and to justify beliefs. These capabilities are habitual ways of acting and as such would presuppose certain beliefs. These beliefs which comprise human universals are universal beliefs, common to rational men no matter in what culture they might reside; all rational human beings will have these common universal beliefs no matter what specific religion or culture or society is raised up on the basis of such universal beliefs. I have given some examples of such beliefs and of the way in which they can be discovered. All of the universal beliefs I have mentioned
were developed through considering the activity of questioning which is a human universal.

Universal beliefs have the additional attribute of being indubitable in the sense that Peirce uses "indubitable." That is to say, when one comes to be aware of the universal beliefs that one has, one finds that one cannot really doubt them. Since the only way in which beliefs can be "discarded" or "given up" is through bringing the beliefs into doubt, and since universal beliefs are not in fact doubted, the meaning Peirce attaches to the term "indubitable," they will continue to be believed. The fact that such beliefs are not doubted (their indubitability) lies in their role as basic constituents of rationality. It is conceivable that they could be doubted, Peirce tells us, so they are not indubitable in that sense, that is, in the sense that it is impossible ever to doubt them -- any belief is open to that contingency. But, as the case stands now, when we come to realize that we have certain universal beliefs, we find that we simply do not genuinely or really doubt them, that no one else doubts them, and that we need them in our lives as human beings. We might pretend that we doubt them, but as Peirce warns us, we should not confuse "pretend to doubt" with "doubt." Such pretense is immediately discovered whenever one is put into a situation such that acting in terms of that belief is appropriate. That one continues to act habitually in terms
of the belief that was thought to be in doubt will serve to destroy the pretense. For example, someone might claim to be doubting that there is a real universe of some kind which has an element of order of some kind. If such a person will carefully attend to his actions, he will find that he is in the habit of behaving in ways that belie his so-called doubt. Thus, the belief he claimed to doubt is in fact indubitable for him in that he, nor any other rational man, does not actually doubt it.

The existence of universal beliefs also provides a way of getting past the kind of difficulties I raised in discussing Whorf's contention that world views are basically relative conceptual systems. Since a belief is constituted in terms of concepts (i.e., to describe a belief requires the use of meaningful words or concepts), and since universal beliefs are found in every human culture or society, there are, therefore, concepts which are common to all rational men. The following are examples of such common concepts: "world," "self," "other men (persons)," "communication," and "intelligence." This is not an exhaustive list, of course. The existence of such concepts provides a bridge by means of which one can begin to learn the total conceptual apparatus and conceptual system of persons in another culture. In addition to the common concepts provided by universal beliefs, there are also other concepts which are common to all men simply due to
the existence of universal kinds of human experience. Here I refer to such things as birth and death, the experience of pain, dreaming, sexual intercourse, and family life.\textsuperscript{1} Given the existence of such common concepts, the relativist's dilemma to which Whorf's view falls prey is no longer a danger for the approach I have suggested, for one can start the representation of another person's world view in terms of these common concepts, thus avoiding the unhappy result that other world views are unknowable. Thus, these beliefs which are universal among men provide us with a set of points of contact by means of which we can begin to make headway in the task of coming to completely understand world views other than our own. From this common starting point we can slowly proceed to inquire more deeply and with more detail into those aspects of another way of life which do not agree with our total belief system.

When one pursues the study of a particular world view, in addition to the presence of universal beliefs, one will also find the kinds of beliefs I have called principia. In contrast to universal beliefs (which characterize rather general human capabilities such as the ability to communicate, or to doubt, or to justify), principia are beliefs

\textsuperscript{1}Peter Winch has a discussion of this factor -- he calls them "limiting notions" -- see "Understanding a Primitive Society," \textit{American Philosophical Quarterly}, 1 (1964), 307-324.
which provide the basic "content" of cognitive or rational life. For example, the ability to justify is essential in rational life, but that could hardly be enough to generate the kind of system of justification that one finds in a world view. To justify a belief requires that there be, in addition to the kinds of universal beliefs that make up the ability to justify (considered in the abstract), another belief which is not now in doubt or in question. Such a second belief would be what I have described as being a principium. Or, to phrase the point in alternative language, the cognitive ability to justify (a human universal) requires that justification come to an end somewhere. Now the "somewhere" wherein justification "ends" is not a belief which is a universal belief (i.e., part of the human universal, the activity of rational justification), rather it could in principle be any belief whatever. It holds its status as a principium, then, simply due to the nature of human justification -- that is, that it must "end" and end "somewhere" -- and simply because of the fact that that is where it does "end" insofar as persons having that particular world view are concerned. Thus, while human justification and its associated universal beliefs remain a constant, because of the nature of such justification the "basic beliefs" or principia which that activity

\[2\] This is a point that Wittgenstein saw very clearly, for he repeats it several times in *On Certainty*, see paragraphs 110, 164, 192.
requires can be very variable. It is this variability that accounts for the differences in world views around the globe, not the putative extreme relativity of concepts proposed by someone like Whorf.

The beliefs which become justified through appeals to principia are the reasoned beliefs I have described earlier. The serviceability of reasoned beliefs lies in their relative openness to change, given the occurrence of new experience. A principium can be a part of the justification of many reasoned beliefs; that is, a transition from one reasoned belief to another can occur without a corresponding change in principia. For example, a pathologist can justify his analysis of several different diseases in terms of the principium that "Every disease has a cause," and he can justify in part both the claim that "Disease X is caused by Y," and "Disease X is caused by Z" by an appeal to that same principium, even though he once believed the former but now has come to believe the latter due to additional experiences he has had. Such reasoned beliefs constitute the highest level of precision or accuracy in a belief system or world view, and they are imminently vulnerable to disconfirmation or replacement.

Using verificational justification as an example, I can now give an overall picture of the interrelationship between the three categories of beliefs which compose a world view. Universal beliefs provide the basic framework
for the nature of certain general kinds of human conduct; in this case, the practice of justifying will be characterized in all cases by the fact that the person involved in justifying will hold certain general beliefs that delineate the nature of that kind of conduct. Justification being what it is, one requires a belief which does not itself have a justification (other than a pragmatic justification). Such a belief will be a principium and will not itself be one of the universal beliefs which comprise the act of justifying. That which is justified through such conduct is a reasoned belief.

All three categories of belief, when in an interrelated whole within a single culture, form those systems of belief which students of man have called world views. Indeed, perhaps one could better express this point by saying that the three categories of belief I have noted are simply ways of trying to get at the general characteristics of such systems of belief. That is to say, my three categories of belief do not represent ontological differences in beliefs. Instead, these categories deal with features of systems of beliefs; they describe sets of relations within a relational system in which the elements related in the system are beliefs. To characterize such relations, structures, or functions is not to say that certain beliefs are possessed of this or that intrinsic quality -- rather, it is to say that the system of beliefs is possessed of
certain qualities. In other words, if one says that X is a belief in a particular culture, and that X is a principium there, saying that does not add to its basic status as a belief, but it describes the kind of place that belief has in relation to the other beliefs in the belief system or world view of that culture. There are not certain sets of specific beliefs which are intrinsically principia; certain beliefs are principia if, upon examination, we find that they fulfill a certain role in a complete world view. Similar considerations apply to reasoned beliefs. The set of universal beliefs is, however, relatively fixed, for they are found in all rational men. But even in the case of universal beliefs, there is no absolute guarantee that the beliefs in that set will forever remain in that status, so here also one sees that the systematic aspect confers the status which universal beliefs have. In other words, no beliefs are intrinsically universal in the absence of this systematic or relational aspect.

In chapter two I devoted considerable space toward achieving an understanding of questioning and presupposing. The relevance of a detailed account of presupposing is obvious due to Collingwood's use of that notion in presenting his account of the nature of metaphysics, an account I have been at pains to emend. But perhaps my detailed consideration of questioning has not seemed completely relevant. At this juncture, it is fairly easy to outline its
importance for an understanding of belief systems. First of all, Collingwood develops his account of presupposing in terms of a consideration of questioning, so there is an obvious exegetical need for the topic. Here one might ask, however, "But does Collingwood do this for some important reason, or is it simply an accident or a matter of taste on his part?" I think that the answer is that he did it for a good reason, although he was not very clear about what that might be. The reason is that in order to have an adequate description of belief, which (as I have shown) is what Collingwood is talking about in his discussion of the nature of metaphysics, one must also have an adequate description of the nature of doubt, which is pretty much what Collingwood means by "questioning." To put this in terms of world views, one could say that principia exist in order to provide justifications, but wanting a justification presupposes that something is in question or in doubt. Thus, the very existence of principia requires that there be doubts or questions in general. Finally, a careful consideration of some aspects of questioning can be helpful to the practicing student of particular world views in that an understanding of its nature would be essential in order to carry out successful interviews with native discussants.

This brings me to chapter one and its brief historical review of world view studies. As I attempted to show
there, virtually every student of world view in both Cultural Anthropology and Folkloristics has been less than complete in presenting the epistemological or theoretical aspect of his work. I have urged that these scholars were basically correct in thinking that the phenomena they described as "basic postulates" or "ultimate premisses" have an important function in any well-considered theory of the nature of world views. But, on the most part, these scholars did not see that these "primitive postulates" are basically beliefs of some kind and not merely concepts; nor did they (generally speaking) offer any logical characterization of the way in which such phenomena are basic in any particular world view system. Moreover, students of world view have tended to gloss over the very serious kinds of issues associated with the problems of relativism, and hence they have tended to favor approaches that are open to the difficulties I have noted for Whorf's position. These difficulties can be met, as I have tried to show, by realizing that the basic phenomenon for world view studies is that of systems of human beliefs and by working out the details of such a claim. In general, then, students of world view have had some worthwhile germinal ideas about the epistemic nature of their subject matter, although that side of their work has been lacking in comprehensiveness and detail. I have tried to supply some of the necessary philosophical labor in developing these seminal pro-
Most students of world view share the belief that world views are found in all cultures, among all men. In terms of my nomenclature, this assumption amounts to a claim that world view is a human universal. If this claim is true, and I suspect that it is, that would mean that human beings around the world have a good deal more in common than scholars who are cultural relativists have led us to believe. The existence of world view as a human universal suggests that it might be possible eventually to characterize this universal or common element; indeed, trying to do that would seem to be more appropriate for a science of man than undertaking studies based upon a strictly relativist position directed toward understanding only particular cultures. Why is world view a human universal? The answer probably lies in the nature of man. As Dilthey said, there seems to be a need in the mental life of all men, a need to bring coherence and unity to the world in response to what Dilthey called "the enigma of life." Or, to paraphrase Aristotle, all men by nature desire to understand.
This bibliography includes works cited in the body of the essay plus additional items which have been useful in its preparation. This listing is not intended to be an exhaustive summary of relevant works. It is, instead, meant to be representative of the subject areas considered insofar as they pertain to this essay.

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July 12, 1972

Charles E. Hardwick, Chairman
Department of Philosophy
Texas Technological University
Lubbock, Texas 79409

Dear Dr. Hardwick:

This is to certify that Kenneth J. Ketner has completed all of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy with a major in Philosophy. The degree will be officially conferred as of July 28, 1972, and will appear on the student's official transcript in the near future. Transcripts may be obtained from the Office of the Registrar, University of California, Santa Barbara, California 93106.

Sincerely,

Robert O. Collins, Dean
Graduate Division

RGC/mc

Mr. Ketner